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Pretrial Drug Testing: 
Is It Vulnerable To Due Process Challenges? 
Peter H. Meyers* 
This nation may be on the brink of an explosion of 
programs that use drug testing to determine whether criminal 
defendants should be jailed or released prior to trial. More than 
a dozen state and federal courts around the country have 
already experimented with pretrial drug testing programs 
modeled after the one operating in the District of Columbia 
since 1984. 1 Similar programs would be mandated nation-wide 
by several bills now pending in Congress with strong Bush 
administration backing.2 
* Visiting Professor of Clinical Law, National Law Center, George Washington 
University. J.D. 1971, National Law Center; B.A. 1968, Marietta College. The 
author wishes to thank Professors Eric Sirulnik and John Banzhaf for their 
comments and suggestions on previous drafts. The author also wishes to thank 
John Carver, Director of the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency, for his 
generous cooperation. 
1. The District of Columbia program was the first comprehensive pretrial drug 
testing rrogram in the United States. JOHN CARVER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., DRUGS 
AND CRIME: CONTROLLING USE AND REDUCING RISK THROUGH TESTING 2 (Sept./Oct. 
1986). Similar drug testing programs were established in eight federal district 
courts in 1989 and 1990, as part of a pilot project undertaken pursuant to the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690. These were the Eastern District 
of Arkansas, Middle District of Florida, Eastern District of Michigan, District of 
Minnesota, District of Nevada, Southern District of New York, District of North 
Dakota, and Western District of Texas. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS, FINAL REPORT: THE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM OF MANDATORY 
DRUG TESTING OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 19 (1991) (hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
At least six county court systems have also experimented with pretrial drug 
testing: Maricopa County (Phoenix), Arizona; Pima County (Tucson), Arizona; New 
Castle County (Wilmington), Delaware; Prince George's County, Maryland; 
Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon; and Milwaukee County, Wisconsin. See 
JOHN CLARK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., ESTIMATING THE CO&'TS OF DRUG TESTING FOR A 
PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAM 1 (1989); see also Richard B. Abell, Pretrial Drug 
Testing: Expanding Rights and Protecting Public Safety, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
943, 946 n.l5 (1989); James K. Stewart, Quid Pro Quo: Stay Drug Free and Stay 
on Release, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1988). 
2. See, e.g., S. 635, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), introduced by Sen. Thurmond 
and others, which requires states receiving certain criminal justice funds to 
285 
286 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 5 
Unfortunately, many of those who lose their liberty as a 
result of a positive drug test may be victims of a test which 
falsely reports drug use if the defendant simply consumed one 
of many common medicines, or if certain basic mistakes or 
mixups occurred in the court's drug-detection laboratory. This 
article suggests that such drug programs can and should be 
challenged as a clear violation of due process if, as in the 
District of Columbia, the program fails to use an available and 
virtually foolproof test to confirm drug use before restricting a 
defendant's liberty. This article also suggests that procedures 
currently in effect in the District fail to provide a 
constitutionally adequate warning to the defendant of the 
adverse consequences that a positive drug test can have in the 
court proceeding before the defendant agrees to submit a urine 
sample. 
Since a positive drug test result can lead to incarceration 
or other drastic impacts upon a defendant's liberty, pretrial 
drug testing procedures should be as reliable and fair as 
possible. These are core values that due process has long 
protected when an individual is threatened with a loss of 
liberty as a result of government action.3 This article 
addresses the procedural protections required by due process to 
insure that drug testing results are accurate and reliable. This 
analysis requires consideration of doctrines from both criminal 
and administrative law, two areas that have merged in some 
significant respects during the past few years. 
In Mathews v. Eldridge,4 the Supreme Court fashioned a 
three-part test for determining the scope of due process 
protections. This test employs a cost/benefit analysis which 
balances the burden on the government of providing an 
additional procedural protection against the anticipated loss to 
the individual if such protection is not provided, and the 
increased reliability the additional protection will provide. This 
test has been applied most commonly to determine whether 
trial-type hearings or similar procedures are required. 
However, this test has also been applied to a variety of other 
implement pretrial drug testing programs in compliance with regulations issued by 
the Attorney General. !d. at § 902. A separate provision mandates post-conviction 
drug testing of federal defendants. ld. at § 901. 
3. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 558 (1974). 
4. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
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situations as well. 
This article suggests that the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis 
should be applied, in conjunction with other factors, to evaluate 
the constitutionality of procedures such as pretrial drug 
testing.5 To illustrate the utility of the Mathews v. Eldridge 
approach, this article will apply it to the need for confirmatory 
testing in the District's drug program,6 and compare this 
methodology to the approaches recently taken by the Supreme 
Court on several related issues, including drug testing of 
government employees, 7 pretrial preventive detention 
procedures,8 and prompt probable cause hearings for persons 
who have been arrested.9 
Establishment of pretrial drug testing programs 
throughout the United States may or may not be a desirable 
objective. 10 However, if such programs are created, it is vital 
5. See John F. Banzhaf, How to Make Drug Tests Pass Constitutional Muster, 
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 12, 1987, at 13. 
6. It is necessary to focus on a specific program because due process analysis 
is dependent, in part, upon the details of a jurisdiction's bail law, its drug testing 
procedures, and the ways in which the drug testing results are utilized by judicial 
officers in the jurisdiction. 
7. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). These cases upheld 
drug testing of certain government employees as reasonable searches and seizures 
within the Fourth Amendment. In both cases, the Court emphasized that the 
procedures employed in the drug testing programs made the test results quite 
reliable. In both cases, the initial immunoassay screen was confirmed by "state-of-
the-art equipment and techniques," Skinner, 489 U.S. at 610 n.3; Von Raab, 489 
U.S. at 673 n.2 ("[t]he combination of EMIT and GC/MS tests required by the 
Service is highly accurate, assuming proper storage, handling, and measurement 
techniques."). 
8. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding federal preventive 
detention law procedures); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (state juvenile 
preventive detention law procedures upheld). 
9. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975) (Fourth Amendment requires 
prompt judicial determination of probable cause for any significant pretrial 
restraint on liberty); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991) 
(initial court hearings within 48 hours of arrests are presumed sufficiently prompt 
within the meaning of Gerstein). 
10. Compare KEVIN B. ZEESE, DRUG TESI'ING LEGAL MANUAL §§ 8.01-02 (Clark 
Boardman 1988) with Abell, supra note 1, at 943-44. 
In addition to due process concerns about the fairness and reliability of pretrial 
drug testing, there are also substantial unanswered questions as to whether such 
programs constitute unreasonable searches and seizures within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The District of Columbia 
Circuit at one time ordered a full evidentiary hearing on these Fourth Amendment 
challenges to the District's drug testing program, but on remand the case was 
dismissed for want of prosecution. Berry v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1031 
(D.C. Cir. 1987), dismissed for want of prosecution, Civil Act. No. 84-2659 (D.D.C. 
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that they be as fair and reliable as possible. The legislatures, 
and ultimately the courts, will be called upon to insure that 
drug testing programs in the criminal justice system satisfy 
due process standards. Pretrial drug testing programs cannot 
be second-rate, not only because they involve the court's own 
essential criminal procedures, but also because of the drastic 
potential consequences of positive test results. 11 
Part I of this article describes the District's criminal laws 
and procedures. Part II discusses the scope and operation of 
the District's drug testing program. Part III sets forth the 
applicable due process principles and analyzes the Mathews v. 
Eldridge test. Part IV identifies the protected "liberty" interests 
which trigger due process protections for pretrial drug testing. 
Part V addresses the need to confirm positive drug tests in 
different pretrial circumstances. Part VI discusses other due 
process concerns with the District's program. Finally, Part VII 
analyzes the usefulness of Mathews v. Eldridge in determining 
the scope of due process protections. 
I. D.C. CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 
A. The Initial Hearing 
Virtually everyone arrested in the District of Columbia is 
brought before a judicial officer of the D.C. Superior Court for 
an initial hearing. 12 The procedure for this initial hearing has 
Aug. 1, 1990). For a discussion of these Fourth Amendment issues, see Cathryn Jo 
Rosen and John S. Goldkamp, The Constitutionality of Drug Testing at the Bail 
Stage, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 114 (1989). Cf Cathryn Jo Rosen, The 
Fourth Amendment Implications of Urine Testing for Evidence of Drug Use in 
Probation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 1159 (1990). 
11. Drug testing laboratories that report erroneous positive test results to the 
court could also be found civilly liable to defendants injured by the erroneous 
information. In one recently reported case, a private employee fired because of a 
false positive drug test result received a $4.1 million jury verdict (mostly punitive 
damages) against the laboratory. See Andrew Blum, State Drug Test Rules are 
Varied: Some are Permissive; Others Regulate Strictly, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 16, 1991, at 
1. 
12. The principal exceptions are persons charged with federal offenses in the 
United States District Court (which does not have a comprehensive drug testing 
program), and persons who are released on citation or bond release (for relatively 
minor offenses) from police precincts. 
Due to the District of Columbia's unique status in relationship to the federal 
government, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia is responsible 
for prosecuting cases in both federal and superior court, and must decide in which 
court charges will be brought. There has been a recent public squabble between 
the U.S. Attorney and a number of federal judges because the U.S. Attorney has 
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been codified in the court's Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
provide that the arrested person shall be taken "without unnec-
essary delay" to the court, and that routine booking procedures 
such as fingerprinting and photographing of the arrestee shall 
be "performed with reasonable promptness."13 
Several important events occur at this initial hearing. 
Defense counsel enters his or her appearance, the charge 
against the defendant is read, and further dates are set for the 
case to return to court. 14 The court also makes a decision on 
whether to release the defendant pending trial, and, if so, un-
der what conditions. 15 If the court imposes any conditions of 
release which "constitute a significant restraint on pretrial 
liberty," the court must also determine whether or not there is 
probable cause to believe the defendant committed the charged 
offense. 16 
brought a substantial number of "small scale" drug and other offenses to federal 
court to take advantage of the tougher federal sentencing provisions. This has sub-
stantially clogged the federal court. See Stop Complaining, Stephens Tells Judges, 
WASHINGTON POST, June 8, 1991, at B1; Stephens vs. The Federal Bench: Both 
Sides Look a Little Muddy, WASHINGTON PoST, June 17, 1991, at F5; Stephens 
Assailed by Judge, WASHINGTON POST, May 25, 1991, at Bl. 
18. D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 5. Routine booking procedures are usually com-
pleted within one and one-half hours in the District of Columbia. See Lively v. 
Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 999, 1008-09 (D.D.C. 1978), discussed in Wendy L. 
Brandes, Comment, Post-Arrest Detention and the Fourth Amendment: Refining the 
Standard of Gerstein v. Pugh, 22 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 445, 458-60 (1989). 
14. The judicial officer will also inform the defendant that he or she is not 
required to make any statement and that any statement may be used against the 
defendant. D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 5(b). The defendant is also informed of the 
complaint and any affidavit filed with it, and of the defendant's right to have 
retained or court-appointed counsel. ld. 
If the case is charged as a felony (i.e., the maximum penalty exceeds one year), 
the initial hearing is called the presentment. The defendant will not plead to the 
complaint which has been filed in court, and only a future preliminary hearing 
date will be set. If the case is charged as a misdemeanor (i.e., the maximum 
penalty is one year or less), the initial hearing is called the arraignment. The 
defendant will plead to the information, and future dates for a status hearing and 
trial will be selected. 
The initial bail hearing is usually presided over by a hearing commissioner, 
whose authority is analogous to that of a federal magistrate. See D.C. SUPER. CT. 
CRIM. R. 117. Generally, judges preside at the initial hearing only on Saturdays 
and holidays. 
15. A substantial majority of adult arrestees (about 85%) are released pending 
trial rather than detained at the initial hearing. Of these, more than 80% are 
released on some form of non-financial conditions (i.e., without being required to 
post a bail bond). Only persons released without financial conditions are eligible for 
supervision, which includes urine surveillance, by the Pretrial Services Agency. 
MARY TOBOHG & JOHN BELLASSAI, PRETRIAL URINE-TESTING IN THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA: THE PERSPECTIVE OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS IN 1989 1-2 (1989). 
16. See supra note 9. The juvenile justice system in the District has analogous 
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The standards that the judicial officer applies in making 
the initial bail decision are set forth in the District of Columbia 
Bail Reform ActY The District of Columbia, like the federal 
courts and many states, authorizes the judicial officer to con-
sider both the defendant's risk of flight and risk of safety to the 
community in setting bail. 18 The statute establishes a pre-
sumption in favor of release without conditions on personal 
recognizance. 19 
The judicial officer also has the authority to hold persons 
without bond for short periods (three or five days) under cer-
tain circumstances, including the "five-day-hold" for narcotic 
addicts, the "three-day-hold" where the defendant is already on 
release in a pending case, and a "three-day-hold" for a preven-
tive detention hearing.20 
The court is also authorized to order detention without 
bond until trial when defendants are charged with first degree 
murder21 or with certain other dangerous or violent offens-
es.22 
procedures for processing youthful arrestees. See TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 
15, at 8-9. 
17. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321 et seq. (1989). 
18. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1989). In evaluating these risks, the judicial 
officer considers the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of 
the evidence against the person, family ties to the area, employment, fmancial re-
sources, character and mental condition, past conduct, length of residence in the 
community, record of convictions, and any record of appearance or non-appearance 
at prior court proceedings. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(b) (1989). 
19. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1989); Wood v. United States, 391 F.2d 981, 
983 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
When the judicial officer determines that personal recognizance or an unsecured 
appearance bond will not reasonably assure the defendant's appearance at future 
court hearings, or assure the safety of the community, the bail law expressly 
requires the court to impose only those conditions that will reasonably assure the 
defendant's appearance and community safety. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1989). 
Money bonds can be imposed solely to minimize the risk of flight, not to assure 
community safety. !d.; Jones v. United States, 347 A.2d 399, 401 (D.C. 1975). 
Moreover, money bonds can only be set after careful consideration and rejection of 
the various non-financial conditions of release. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(a) (1989). 
20. Each of these "holds" is discretionary with the court. If the court grants the 
hold, the defendant is detained without bond for the prescribed number of days, 
and then a judicial officer will reconsider the bond issue and make a decision on 
whether to release the defendant. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(e) (1989) (proba-
tion and parole holds); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1323 (hold for narcotic addicts); D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (hold for pending charge); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(c) 
(preventive detention hold). 
21. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1325(a) (Supp. 1991). 
22. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(a) (1989). 
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B. Timing of the Initial Hearing 
The timing of the initial hearing is important because it 
determines the feasibility of conducting initial drug testing and 
of using confirmatory tests. 
The court's rules provide that the initial hearing shall be 
conducted "without unnecessary delay."23 In practice, the ini-
tial hearing is usually held on the next day, within twenty-four 
hours of arrest. The major exception to this is when the arrest 
occurs on Saturday. Then, the initial hearing will generally be 
held within forty-eight hours of arrest, since the court will not 
sit again until Monday. 
In Gerstein v. Pugh,24 the Supreme Court held that the 
probable cause determination must be made "promptly" when-
ever the person arrested is subjected to any significant re-
straint on his or her pretrial liberty. Subsequently, in the re-
cent case of County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 25 the Court 
ruled that there is a presumption that probable cause hearings 
held within forty-eight hours of arrest are constitutional, and a 
presumption that probable cause hearings held more than 
forty-eight hours after arrest are unreasonably delayed, and 
therefore unconstitutional, under Gerstein. 26 The Court indi-
cated that routine booking procedures may be employed be-
tween the arrest and the probable cause hearing, so long as 
these procedures and "other practical realities" do not unrea-
sonably delay the probable cause hearing.27 The Court's lan-
guage suggests that routine drug testing could be one of those 
"other practical realities" which could permissibly be accom-
plished prior to the initial hearing if it did not delay the proba-
ble cause determination beyond forty-eight hours. However, the 
23. D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 5(a). 
24. 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975). 
25. 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991). 
26. !d. at 1670. 
27. See id.: 
!d. 
In evaluating whether the delay in a particular case is unreasonable, 
however, courts must allow a substantial degree of flexibility. Courts 
cannot ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting arrested per-
sons from one facility to another, handling late-night bookings where no 
magistrate is readily available, obtaining the presence of an arresting 
officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the premis-
es of an arrest, and other practical realities. 
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Court's language appears to make clear that "routine" proce-
dures (like booking or drug testing) cannot constitutionally be 
utilized if they delay the probable cause determination beyond 
forty-eight hours. 28 
C. Sanctions for Non-Compliance 
Defendants who are not detained at their initial hearings 
are released with certain conditions and restrictions placed 
upon them while the case is pending. For example, the release 
form that all released defendants are required to sign provides 
that they shall not commit any new offense while on release. If 
they do, it could trigger further sanctions.29 
Many defendants are released on condition that they pro-
vide regular (usually once a week) urine samples at the court-
house. The trial judge is kept apprised of whether these defen-
dants appear for the scheduled appointments and whether 
urine samples submitted by defendants test positive or nega-
28. See id.: 
ld. 
Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause deter-
mination within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the ar-
rested individual does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable 
delay. Rather, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the 
existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. 
The fact that in a particular case it may take longer than 48 hours to 
consolidate pretrial proceedings does not qualify as an extraordinary cir-
cumstance. 
Among the four dissenters in County of Riverside was Justice Scalia, who criti-
cized as "extremely unpersuasive" the reasons given by the county for delaying 
probable cause hearings, including the "need to take blood and urine samples 
promptly in drug cases". ld. at 1676 n.3. 
29. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1328 (1989) ("release papers" for persons convicted 
of a new offense while on release in an earlier case). Of course, possession of any 
illicit drug in the District of Columbia is a criminal offense, D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-
541(d) (1989), and this would be a violation of the universally imposed condition of 
release not to commit any criminal offense. 
Possession of any illicit drug (or "controlled substance" as most statutes classify 
them) is a misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine of up to 
$1,000, or both, for a first offense. ld. For the "trafficking" offenses of possession 
with intent to distribute, distribution, manufacture, etc., the penalty is almost 
always a felony, with substantial mandatory minimum sentences involved. For 
instance, there is a mandatory minimum sentence of four to twelve years for first 
time trafficking offenses involving "street level" amounts of heroin and cocaine base 
(crack). D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(c) (1988). 
It is not an offense in the District, or in most other states, to "use" an illicit 
drug. However, an individual must "possess" a drug (even for a very brief period of 
time) in order to "use" it. See generally GERALD F. DELMAN & VICTOR G. HADDOX, 
DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK §§ 6.1-6.2 (Clark Boardman 1990). 
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tive. 
The trial judge has a wide array of sanctions that can be 
imposed for violating the prohibition on the use of drugs or any 
other condition of release. One option is to modify the condi-
tions of release, by imposing a new monetary bond, or imposing 
additional nonfinancial release conditions.30 To find that a 
person violated a condition of release, justifying modification of 
those conditions, requires "clear and convincing" evidence of the 
violation.31 In other words, for a drug testing violation there 
would have to be "clear and convincing" evidence that a posi-
tive drug test reflected actual drug use in violation of the 
court's order. 
The most potentially drastic result of a positive drug test is 
the contempt hearing to determine if the defendant intentional-
ly violated his or her release conditions. 32 This is a criminal 
proceeding, presided over by the trial judge, who can impose a 
separate conviction for contempt of court, and a sentence of up 
to six months imprisonment or a fine of up to $1,000, or 
both.33 At this hearing, the defendant has essentially all the 
due process rights a defendant has at any non-jury criminal 
trial,34 including the requirement that allegations against the 
defendant be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt."35 Thus, the 
issue in a contempt hearing is whether the government's drug 
test proved "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant had 
used drugs in violation of release conditions. 36 
30. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23.1329 (1989). Trial judges have imposed a wide 
variety of non-financial conditions of release on persons who have violated drug 
testing requirements, including increased frequency of drug testing (e.g., from once 
to twice a week), third party custody, curfew, or referral for treatment or counsel-
ling. See CARVER, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
31. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1329(b)(1) (1989). 
32. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-l329(c) (1989). 
33. !d.; see also D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 42(b). This is an out-of-court con-
tempt, which requires an adversarial hearing to resolve, and cannot be dealt with 
summarily. See D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 42(a); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
34. These due process rights include the right to notice and counsel, Cooke v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925), to call witnesses in defense, id., and to a 
public trial before an impartial tribunal, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273-75. 
35. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273-75; Parker v. United States, 373 A.2d 906, 
907 (D.C. 1977). 
36. This is, of course, the heaviest burden of proof in the American legal 
system. The criminal contempt proceeding is the most compelling context for 
requiring confirmation or other procedures to ensure reliability, because of this 
burden of proof, and for other reasons discussed below. 
The use of contempt hearings to deal with positive drug tests was more wide-
spread at the beginning of the District's program than it is today. Toborg and 
294 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 5 
Other less severe actions can also be taken by the trial 
judge as the result of a positive drug test, including a stern 
warning to the defendant, or holding the defendant in custody 
until court recesses later that same day.37 
II. D.C. DRUG TESTING PROGRAM 
A. Creation and Operation of the Program 
Drug testing of arrestees in the District of Columbia has 
existed since the early 1970s, but on such an infrequent basis 
that it had minimal impact on the criminal justice system.38 
Beginning in March of 1984, a new comprehensive pretrial 
drug testing program was established for adult arrestees, and 
extended to cover juveniles in 1986.39 This program calls for 
the testing of arrestees in three situations: (1) routine testing 
of persons prior to their initial hearing, (2) testing of persons 
released at the initial hearing, and (3) testing in accordance 
with special orders of the court, such as when a defendant is 
late to court.40 
The drug testing program is operated by the D.C. Pretrial 
Services Agency ("PSA"), an independent agency of the D.C. 
GovernmentY PSA employees go to the superior court lock-up 
early each morning to collect urine samples from arrestees.42 
Bellassai explain this trend: 
Many judges who back in 1985 reported that they often held contempt 
hearings for condition violations told the Toborg Associates study team in 
1989 that they no longer did so as frequently because of the press of 
ever-growing court dockets. 
TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 25. 
37. ld. 
38. CARVER, supra note 1, at 2. 
39. TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 1. The D.C. program was promoted 
and initially funded by the National Institute of Justice of the U.S. Department of 
Justice. CARVER, supra note 1, at 1. The D.C. program tests adults for five catego-
ries of drugs: opiates (primarily heroin), cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), 
amphetamines, and methadone. Juveniles are tested for similar drugs, except that 
they are tested for marijuana but not amphetamines. ld. at 7-8. 
40. CARVER, supra note 1, at 2. PSA conducts tests on approximately 65,000-
70,000 urine samples each year, including adults and juveniles. Conversation with 
John Carver, Director of the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency (1991). 
41. PSA has several responsibilities: It interviews all adult arrestees to deter-
mine their eligibility for pretrial release; it makes release recommendations to the 
judicial officer presiding at the initial hearing; and, it monitors compliance with 
release conditions for all defendants, except those released on surety bond. D.C. 
CODE ANN. §§ 23-1301 to 23-1302 (1989); TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 
1. 
42. Some defendants refuse to provide a urine sample, some are unable to 
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The arrestees are requested to provide urine samples, and told 
by the PSA representative that the test result will be used only 
for determining conditions of release and not used as evidence 
to prove guilt of the underlying chargeY 
While a defendant in lock-up has the right to refuse to 
provide a urine sample, just as the defendant can refuse to be 
interviewed at all by PSA (to obtain general background in-
formation), very few refuse to provide a urine sample.44 In the 
provide one, and some are brought in too late in the morning to be tested. Often, 
the judicial officer will condition release for these defendants upon the subsequent 
provision of a urine sample. MARY TOBORG & JOHN BELLASSAI, PRETRIAL URINE 
TESTING IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: THE VIEWS OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS 4 (1986). 
PSA staff wait at the lock-up while the arrestees provide urine samples, and 
observe the collection process, to prevent tampering or substitution of one person's 
urine for another. CARVER, supra note 1, at 4. Mter the sample is provided, the 
arrestee verifies his or her name and seals the specimen cap. The sample is then 
taken directly from the cellblock to PSA's on-site laboratory, which is located in 
the same building as the lock-up. 
43. CARVER, supra note 1, at 3: The PSA staff member bases his or her repre-
sentations on the directives of the agency's Training Manual: 
My name is ___ and I work for the Pretrial Services Agency. I 
am here to collect a urine sample from you. You do not have to give a 
sample, but if you do, the sample will be tested for drugs and the results 
given to the judge or hearing commissioner for use at your bail hearing. 
The test results will be used only to determine conditions of release in 
your case. They cannot be used to determine whether you are guilty or 
innocent of today's charges. If you choose not to provide a sample, the 
Court may order you to provide one if and when you are released. 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCY, PRETRIAL SERVICES TRAINING 
AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 159 (1991). When an arrestee refuses to provide a urine 
sample, the PSA representative is directed to remind the person that "the informa-
tion from the test results will only be used to assist in setting release conditions." 
I d. 
This limitation on the use of drug test results is based upon the PSA's en-
abling statute, which provides that: "Any information contained in the agency's 
files . . . shall not be admissible on the issue of guilt in any judicial proceed-
ing . . . but such information may be used . . . for the purpose of impeachment 
in any subsequent proceeding." D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1303(d) (1989). 
Based upon this provision, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held in 
Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1988), that positive drug tests are ad-
missible at trial to impeach a defendant, such as where the defendant testifies 
that he never used drugs or has no knowledge of them. The government can then 
call a PSA representative to testify concerning the defendant's positive drug test(s). 
ld. 
While in a narrow sense the positive drug test is not introduced for the pur-
pose of proving that the defendant committed the charged offense, the positive 
result may be used (with potentially damaging effect) at defendant's trial to under-
cut the defendant's credibility. This is not explained clearly to defendants prior to 
being asked to provide a urine sample. The information currently provided by 
PSA appears to be seriously misleading in this regard. See text accompanying 
notes 165-66, infra. 
44. A much higher percentage of arrestees refused to provide a sample in the 
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view of the Director of PSA, this occurs because they have been 
informed by the agency of the limited use that will be made of 
the test results in the court proceedings.45 
The results of the drug test are generally available within 
one or two hours,46 and are communicated to the judicial offi-
cer presiding over the initial hearing for consideration in deter-
mining conditions of release.47 
B. The EMIT Testing System 
The Superior Court's drug testing program relies exclusive-
ly on the EMIT drug screening test.48 The EMIT test is one of 
federal program involving eight federal judicial districts. The overall refusal rate 
was 13% in the first year of operation, and 23% in the second year. Final Report, 
supra note 1, at 22. These high refusal rates may reflect the advice of counsel, 
given to defendants in interviews prior to contact with the PSA representative. See 
id. at 18. In D.C. Superior Court, the PSA representative contacts the defendant 
prior to the interview with defense counsel. In light of the potential consequences 
that a positive drug test can have, the best advice to a client may well be to "just 
say no" to the drug test. 
45. CARVER, supra note 1, at 3. 
46. PSA conducts initial tests on an average of about 1,300 to 1,500 adult 
arrestees each month, and about 300 to 400 juveniles. TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra 
note 15, at 10. Most of the adults test positive for at least one drug. When the 
program began in March 1984, 59% tested positive, which increased to the peak of 
76% in February 1988. !d. at 17. This percentage has subsequently declined, and 
for the period of June 1990 through July 1991, the percentage of adult arrestees 
testing positive has been in the range of 50 to 58%. Monthly Memorandum from 
John Carver to Interested Parties 1 (July 2, 1991). The rate of drug use for juve-
nile arrestees is substantially lower: 35% in 1987, 30% in 1988, and 25% in the 
first half of 1989. TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 8. 
47. The PSA report to the judicial officer also contains information on the 
arrestee's residence, family, employment, ties to the community, prior criminal 
convictions, and pending charges. The PSA representative, or defense counsel, will 
attempt to contact family or friends of the defendant to verify the information 
provided. 
D.C. Superior Court judicial officers make a "great deal of use" of PSA drug 
test results, both in making initial release decisions and in monitoring compliance 
with drug-related conditions of release. This was the conclusion of a survey of 25 
judges and commissioners conducted in 1985, one year after the program was 
established. See ToBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 42, at 5, 8. The same conclusion 
was reached after a re-survey of the court's judicial officers in 1989. See TOBORG & 
BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 22-23. According to the 1985 survey, one of the "most 
striking" results of the PSA drug testing program was the increase in the number 
of hearings held for violations of conditions of release, a result attributed by the 
judicial officers to "(t]he availability of hard data from a reliable source, coupled 
with the immediate availability of PSA staff to testify at violations hearings .... " 
!d. at 8. 
48. The EMIT test, which is an acronym for Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay 
Technique, was developed and is now marketed by the Syva Company of Palo Alto, 
California. 
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the quickest and cheapest drug tests available today, and it is 
the most widely used drug screening test in the United 
States.49 It does not require sophisticated equipment or labo-
ratory-trained personnel, and can be done on-site where the 
urine samples are provided. 50 
Each sample that tests positive is re-tested, using the same 
EMIT test.51 PSA does not confirm "positive" results with a 
49. ZEESE, supra note 10, at 2-7; Daniel P. Mazo, Yellow Rows of Test Tubes: 
Due Process Constraints on Discharges of Public Employees Based on Drug Urinaly-
sis Testing, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1623, 1642 (1987). 
50. The operation of the EMIT system has been described as follows: 
Immunoassays are based on the principle of competition between la-
beled and unlabeled antigen (drug) for binding sites on a specific anti-
body. Antibodies are protein substances with sites on their surfaces to 
which specific drugs or drug metabolites will bind. These antibodies are 
formed by inoculating animals with appropriate immunogens. 
* * * 
In the EMIT assay, the label on the antigen is an enzyme (protein) 
that produces a chemical reaction for detection of drugs. This detection is 
based on the competition between unlabeled drug or drug metabolite and 
labeled drug or drug metabolite for binding sites on the antibody. Urine 
is mixed with a reagent containing [an enzyme substrate] and antibodies 
to the drug, as well a second reagent containing a drug derivative labeled 
with [the enzyme]. The enzyme-labeled drug when bound to an antibody 
site is incapable of interacting with the [enzyme] substrate .... If the 
enzyme-labeled drug does not bind to the antibody, then it is free to 
react with the substrate. The drug in the subject's urine competes for the 
limited number of antibody binding sites and thereby proportionally in· 
creases the total enzyme activity. The enzymatic activity is therefore 
directly related to the concentration of the drug present in the urine. 
Richard Hawks, Analytical Methodology, in URINE TESTING FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE, 
30-31 (Richard Hawks & C. Nora Chiang eds., NIDA Research Monograph No. 73, 
1986). For a thorough discussion of the accuracy and reliability of the EMIT test, 
see Lawrence Miike & Maria Hewitt, Accuracy and Reliability of Urine Drug Tests, 
36 KAN. L. REV. 641 (1988). See generally John S. Goldkamp et al., Pretrial Drug 
Testing and Defendant Risk, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 585 (1990). 
51. Urine tests are generally classified as either screening tests or confirmatory 
tests. A screening test is the initial test used to detect drugs in urine. It is rapid 
and less expensive, but not as accurate as confirmation tests. See CHRISTY VISHER 
& KAREN MCFADDEN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., A COMPARISON OF URINALYSIS TECH-
NOLOGIES FOR DRUG TESTING IN CRIMINAL JUSI'ICE 3 (1991). 
A confirmation test is a second test used to confirm positive results from an 
initial screening test. It uses a different methodology, and provides a greater 
margin of certainty. !d. 
The most commonly used screening tests are enzyme multiplied immunoassay 
(EMIT), radioimmunoassay (RIA), fluorescein immunoassay (TDx), and thin layer 
chromatography (TLC). Miike & Hewitt, supra note 50, at 644-46. 
Confirmation tests include gas chromatography, gas chromatography/mass 
spectrometry (GC/MS), and high-performance liquid chromatography. The GC/MS 
test is considered the most reliable state-of-the-art test. Confirmation by GC/MS 
would result in a better than 99.9% reliability, and would "eliminate virtually all 
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more specific (or selective) confirmatory test, as is done in the 
great majority of other drug testing programs.52 Mter the 
sample is re-tested it is disposed of, and is not available if the 
defendant later seeks re-testing by an alternative methodology. 
Unconfirmed EMIT tests can produce erroneous results 
due to both inherent limitations in the EMIT testing system 
and operator or equipment error in the use of the system. In-
herent limitations in the EMIT testing system result in both 
"false positive" and "false negative" results. 53 There are sever-
al well-known inherent sources of false positive EMIT results. 
First, substances in the urine sample besides the drug being 
tested for can "cross-react," or give a positive result, when no 
drug is present. In addition, even when a drug is present in a 
defendant's urine, the drug could have been consumed in a 
legal product, such as cough medicines or even poppy-seeded 
bagels. In fact, a wide variety of substances have been found to 
generate positive results for opiates, amphetamines, and other 
controlled substances.54 Analogues of PCP,55 such as TCP, 
false positive errors." See VISHER & McFADDEN, supra note 51, at 3. 
52. See infra text accompanying notes 123-36. There have been a few instances 
in the past two years where PSA has sent urine samples which tested positive on 
the EMIT test to an outside laboratory for confirmation by GC/MS. In these cases 
where PSA voluntarily sought confirmation, the defendant had challenged the 
initial positive results as false positives. Conversation with John Carver, Director 
of the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency (1991). The fact that PSA has 
sought confirmation of EMIT results in a few isolated cases indicates that even 
PSA recognizes that confirmation by GC/MS can provide significant additional 
reliability of test results in contested cases. 
53. Visher and McFadden provide the following definitions: 
False positive: a test result indicating positive for a given drug when 
that drug is actually absent in a urine sample or present in concentra-
tions below the designated cutoff level. 
False negative: A negative test result for a given drug when that drug 
is present in a sample above the cutoff level for the test. 
Cutoff level: The concentration of a drug in urine, usually in 
nanograms per milliliter (ng/mL), used to determine whether a specimen 
is positive (at or above the cutoff level) or negative (below the cutoff 
level) for the drug in question. 
VISHER & MCFADDEN, supra note 51, at 3. 
54. The Syva Company has acknowledged that codeine (a prescription pain 
killer), pholcodine (a cough syrup ingredient), and even poppy-seeded bagels will 
yield a positive result on the EMIT opiate test; ephedrine (found in Nyquil and 
other cold medications) and phenylopromanolamine (found in over sixty common 
products such as Contac, Allerest, and St. Joseph Cold Tablets for Children) will 
cross-react with the EMIT test for amphetamines. ZEESE, supra note 10, at A2-1, 
quoting from Syva filing with the General Accounting Office. For an extensive 
listing of the array of substances that have been found to cross-react with the 
EMIT test used by PSA, see id. at A2-1 through A2-3. 
55. Analogues are chemical compounds with similar but slightly different 
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could cause a false positive EMIT test result. 56 Another type 
of error leading to false positive results occurs when urine 
samples contain an enzyme that can mimic the one used in the 
EMIT test. 57 
These sources of error are unavoidable using the EMIT 
methodology. They cannot be eliminated by flawless operation 
of the system, or by a second "confirmatory" EMIT test of the 
same sample, as is now done by PSA. For example, a urine 
sample containing a cross-reactive substance will always give a 
positive EMIT result. Moreover, the frequency of these inherent 
errors is difficult to estimate, for it derives from the random-
ness of machine error and the idiosyncrasies of the urine con-
tent of the tested population. 
A second class of error is due not to the inherent unreli-
ability of the EMIT system but to poor operation or deliberate 
subversion.58 For example, false positive results will occur if 
the equipment is not properly calibrated or carefully cleaned 
after each test. 59 In laboratories which use only the EMIT 
structures. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Generix Drug Sales, Inc., 460 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th 
Cir. 1972). 
56. United States v. Roy, 113 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2317, 2320 (D.C. Sup. Ct. 
Sep. 24, 1985) (quoting testimony of Syva Co. employee). 
57. John P. Morgan, Problems of Mass Urine Screening {or Misused Drugs, 16 
J. P&'YCHOACTIVE DRUGS 305, 317 (1984). 
58. Robert Blanke makes the following observation: 
Errors of omission as well as commission occur in all human activi-
ties. Fatigue, poor health, and boredom arising from the tedium of routine 
tasks all contribute to high error rates. Providing good working condi-
tions, effective rest periods, and rotation of workers through different 
tasks can help to alleviate these problems .... 
Inappropriate training or experience for the task being carried out can 
also lead to errors . . . . 
The most difficult errors to control are administrative ones. Labeling 
errors, spelling errors, transposition of numbers, all can lead to a correct 
test result being assigned to the wrong subject. In fact, most laboratories 
have learned by participating in external PT programs that these occur 
more frequently than errors in testing procedures. 
Robert Blanke, Accuracy in Urinalysis, in URINE TESTING FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE, at 
50 (Richard Hawks & C. Nora Chiang eds., NIDA Research Monograph No. 73, 
1986). 
59. This might occur if a urine sample which contained PCP or another drug 
was tested in the EMIT equipment and then not all the residue from that sample 
was cleaned from the equipment. The next sample tested could have a false 
positive result because of the drug contained in the prior urine sample. 
False positive results are also caused by contamination of samples or equip-
ment, improper calibration, inadequate maintenance of the equipment, temperature 
variations, or failures in the chain-of-custody system. The very ease of performing 
these tests belies the care with which they must be done, and the consequent 
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test, the many mistakes which can result from not carefully 
following the proper procedures are magnified by the absence of 
an appropriate confirmation test. 
C. Overall Reliability of EMIT 
There has been a great deal of controversy over the reli-
ability and accuracy of the EMIT test and the other 
immunoassays. On one extreme is a recent study comparing 
the reliability of the EMIT system with three other screening 
tests. This study found that both false positives and false nega-
tives varied widely for the different testing systems; EMIT's 
false positive rate went as high as 2.5 percent for cocaine and 
reliance on persons who are not trained to laboratory standards may lead to an 
under-appreciation of the danger of cross-reactivity and the importance of other 
potential threats to the accuracy of the tests. For example, in United States v. Roy, 
the defense introduced PSA log sheets which reflected sloppy and careless opera-
tions of the system in Superior Court: 
The defense, however, introduced the log sheets on which the comput-
er values were recorded in the tests run on the defendant's urine from 
October 18, 1984, through December 19, 1984, a total of sixteen weekly 
tests. On six of these log sheets, there is no indication in the space pro-
vided that the calibration tests were performed. Additionally, defendant 
points out that on eight log sheets the operator failed to record complete-
ly the time when the test was begun and ended. The defendant also 
points to three log sheets on which no negative calibrations were record-
ed. 
United States v. Roy, 114 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2481, 2488 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 
1986). There was also the case reported in the press of a defendant who allegedly 
bribed PSA employees to have his urine test results reported as negative when 
they were actually positive. See Bribery Accusations Probed in D.C. Drug Screening 
Unit, WASHINGTON POST, July 12, 1988, at B1; Defendant Back in Jail Over Posi-
tive Drug Test, WASHINGTON POST, July 14, 1988, at B3. PSA employees could also 
be bribed to report negative test results as positive, if, for example, a competing 
drug dealer wished to get his competitor off the streets. 
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2.2 percent for the opiates.60 
Many authorities believe that the estimate of EMIT's accu-
racy at ninety-seven or ninety-eight percent represents ideal 
laboratory conditions which are not often met in the "real 
world."61 There have been a variety of published studies which 
have documented false positive error rates for EMIT in prisons 
and other testing contexts in the range of four percent to thir-
60. Visher and McFadden document the following false positive rates in their 
study of EMIT testing. VISHER & McFADDEN, supra note 51, at 3. 
False Positive Rates* by Drug Type 
Percent Incorrect positives 
5 
4 
3 
2 
0 
Opiates Cocaine Marijuana PCP Amphetamines 
- RIA r:::::J EMIT CJ TDx IO.'S:! TLC 
*Negative by GC/MS but positive by screening test 
61. See ZEESE, supra note 10, at §§ 3.01-3.05. The problem of inaccurate testing 
is not limited to drug tests. Studies have also documented substantial error rates 
by forensic laboratories which analyze other items such as blood, hair, and paint. 
See Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 109, 109-24 (1991). 
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ty-eight percent.62 
62. The following studies involved false positive rates for EMIT. Many of the 
highest false positive rates were from laboratories which ran only a single EMIT 
test, and did not repeat the test for positive samples. The complete citations to the 
studies follow the chart: 
Date Study False Positive % 
1981 O'Connor and Rejent• 15% 
1982 Center for Human Toxicologl 11% and 38% 
1982 Whiting and Manders' 33% 
1984 Center for Disease Controld 4% 
1984 N.J. Dept. of Corrections• 25% 
1984 Jones et alf 34% 
1984 Black et aF 28% 
1985 Sutheimer et al.h 4.6% 
1985 Frederick et aJ.i 7% 
1986 Fort Meadei 4% 
• Janice E. O'Connor & Thomas A. Rejent, EMIT Cannabinoid Assay: 
Confirmation by RIA and GC/MS, 5 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOL. 168, 168-73 
(1981). 
b Michael Peat et al., Laboratory Evaluation of Immunoassay Kits for 
the Detection of Cannabinoids in Biological Fluids, in THE ANALYSIS OF 
CANNABINOIDS IN BIOLOGICAL FLUIDS, at 85-98 (Richard Hawks ed., NIDA 
Monograph No. 42, 1982). 
' John D. Whiting & William W. Manders, Confirmation of a Tetrahy-
drocannabinol Metabolite in Urine by Gas Chromatography, 6 J. ANALYTI-
CAL TOXICOL. 49, 49-52 (1982). 
d Center for Disease Control, Survey of Laboratories, cited in Peranzo 
v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1511 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
• Morgan, supra note 57, at 305-17. 
r A. Jones et al., Analysis of the Major Metabolite of Delta-9-tetrahy-
drocannabinol in Urine N: A Comparison of Five Methods, 8 J. ANALYTI-
CAL TOXICOL. 249, 249-51 (1984). 
g David L. Black et al., Urine Cannabinoid Analysis: An Integrated 
Multi-method Approach, 8 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOL. 224, 224-27 (1984). 
h C.A. Sutheimer et al., Detection and Confirmation of Urinary 
Cannabinoids, 9 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOL. 156, 156-59 (1985). 
i David L. Frederick et al., Comparison of Six Cannabinoid Metabolite 
Assays, 9 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOL. 116, 116-20 (1985). 
i Marshal L. Abercrombie & John S. Jewell, Evaluation of EMIT and 
RIA High Volume Test Procedures for THC Metabolites in Urine Utilizing 
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Studies of the performance of commercial testing laborato-
ries around the country by the Federal Centers for Disease 
Control demonstrate that, in actual practice, error rates for 
drug testing can be in the range of twenty to fifty percent, in-
cluding false negatives and false positives. At least one such 
laboratory actually reached a one-hundred percent error 
rate.63 
Clearly, there have been very wide variances in the exper-
tise with which different laboratories perform screening tests. 
It is also likely that there will be wide variances in the reliabil-
ity of screening tests as administered in different pretrial test-
ing programs. 
Ill. DUE PROCESS PRINCIPLES 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law." This provision is ap-
plicable to both the federal and District of Columbia govern-
ments, and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment imposes a similar mandate on the states.64 
One of the central purposes of due process protections is to 
ensure fair procedures that minimize the risk of arbitrary or 
GC/MS Confirmation, 10 J. ANALYTICAL TOXlCOL. 178, 178-80 (1986). 
63. Hugh Hansen et al., Crisis in Drug Testing: Results of CDC Blind Study, 
253 J. AMER. MED. Ass'N 2382 (1985). This blind study of thirteen laboratories in 
the United States which served a total of 262 methadone treatment facilities, found 
the following false positive results: 
Drug False Positive Rate of Up to: 
Barbiturates 6% 
Amphetamines 37% 
Methadone 66% 
Cocaine 6% 
Codeine 7% 
Morphine 10% 
64. See generally Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977). The Su-
preme Court has often cited precedents involving federal and state due process 
protections interchangeably. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-
49 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263-65 (1989). 
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erroneous decisions. 65 This has often been referred to as "pro-
cedural" due process, as distinguished from so-called "substan-
tive" due process, and it has come to hold a position of great 
importance in American jurisprudence.66 The goal is to mini-
mize the risk of arbitrary or erroneous decisions to the extent 
feasible; insuring an error-free process is, of course, impossi-
ble.67 
Current Supreme Court doctrine applies a two-step analy-
sis to determine the scope of due process protections in a given 
situation. The first step is to determine whether the individual 
has a protected interest in the nature of "liberty" or "property" 
which can be adversely affected by govemment action. In mak-
ing this determination, the Court will "look not to the 'weight' 
but to the nature of the interest at stake."68 As long as the "de-
privation is 'not de minimis,' its gravity is irrelevant to the 
question of whether" due process protections apply.69 
65. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 558 (1974). 
66. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746, 752; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 
347 (1943) ("The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of 
procedural safeguards."); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 
11:14, at 402-03 (2d ed. 1979). 
67. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) ("There is always in 
litigation a margin of error, representing error in fact-finding, which both parties 
must take into account."). The Court in Mackey v. Montrym emphasized that: 
[T]he Due Process Clause has never been construed to require that 
the procedures used to guard against an erroneous deprivation of a 
protectible "property" or "liberty" interest be so comprehensive as to pre-
clude any possibility of error. The Due Process Clause simply does not 
mandate that all governmental decisionmaking comply with standards 
that assure perfect, error-free determinations. 
Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) (citation omitted). 
68. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972); see Kentucky Dep't 
of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). 
The prior Supreme Court test for determining whether due process protections 
apply to a given situation was a one-step process which balanced the weight of the 
individual's interests against the interests of the government. See Cafeteria & Res-
taurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (no due process protections 
where government's interests in security of a military base outweighed a civilian 
restaurant employee's interest in employment at that specific job). 
This older one-step balancing process to determine whether due process 
protections apply is quite similar to the current Supreme Court's balancing test to 
determine whether a search conducted under "special circumstances" is reasonable 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von 
Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (both upholding the drug testing of certain government 
employees, because the government's interest in the testing of the employees was 
greater than the employees' privacy interests). 
69. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975); Roth, 408 U.S. at 570-71; 
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If interests in the nature of "liberty" or "property" are 
found to be involved, the Court must then determine what pro-
cess is due, i.e., what procedural protections are required under 
the circumstances. It has often been stated that due process "is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particu-
lar situation demands."70 
The framework for determining what process is required 
was set out in Mathews v. Eldridge.71 It focuses on three fac-
tors: 
[l]dentification of the specific dictates of due process 
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the government's interest, including the function in-
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977). 
70. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); McElroy, 367 U.S. at 895. 
The procedural protections in dispute in due process cases are typically the 
right to notice of governmental action and to a hearing to present one's side of the 
controversy before the governmental action is taken. Depending on the circumstanc-
es, due process may require that at the hearing the individual has the right to 
participate orally or in writing, be represented by an attorney, the right to an 
independent decisionmaker, and/or a statement of reasons for the government's 
decision. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (rights in a hearing to 
trapsfer prisoner to a mental hospital); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) 
(rights in a proceeding to withhold welfare benefits). 
The earlier Supreme Court cases did not formulate the issue by focusing so 
much on the precise degree of procedural protections required by due process, but 
looked at the issue as more of an "either-or" issue of requiring notice and a 
hearing before any grievous deprivation of liberty or property. Twining v. New 
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908); Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915). 
One traditional exception to the requirement of a hearing is the so-called 
"testing exception," which has been codified in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 
U.S.C. § 554(a)(3) (1966 & Supp. 1991). This provision exempts from the general 
requirement of an on-the-record hearing all "proceedings in which decisions rest 
solely on inspections, tests, or elections." See DAVIS, supra note 66, at 445-49; cf 
Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (dis-
missal of medical student); Whitfield v. Illinois Board of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 
474, 478 n.12 (7th Cir. 1974) (failure on bar examination). 
The justification for this exception is that certain issues are best resolved not 
by holding an evidentiary hearing, but by an examination or inspection by experts 
in that field. Of course, any action taken by the government on the basis of its 
examination which adversely effects a protected interest would still have to comply 
with due process, including the right of an aggrieved party to challenge the fair-
ness or accuracy of the examination. See APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 558(b), 702 (1966) 
(judicial review). 
71. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
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volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-
tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 72 
This test is essentially a type of cost/benefit analysis. It 
originated and was first applied in the area of administrative 
law, such as the termination of disability payments involved in 
Mathews v. Eldridge, but it has since been applied by the Su-
preme Court to a number of proceedings which are part of the 
criminal justice process, including the bail decision made at the 
initial hearing,73 and to several other proceedings which can 
be characterized as quasi-criminal in nature.74 
There has been substantial scholarly criticism of constitu-
tional balancing tests in general, and of the Mathews v. 
Eldridge test in particular. With respect to constitutional bal-
ancing tests generally, it has been argued that such tests lack 
objectivity, requiring judges to apply their subjective determi-
nations of what "weight" is to be accorded to the different inter-
ests involved, 75 and ultimately resulting in a devaluation of 
fundamental rights. 76 
The Mathews v. Eldridge test has also been criticized on a 
number of specific grounds. Several commentators have criti-
cized the test for focusing on only "instrumental" judgments 
72. Id. at 335. 
73. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746, 752 (1987) (bail hearing for 
adult defendants); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 274 (1984) (bail hearing for 
juveniles). The Mathews v. Eldridge test has even been applied to determine 
whether due process requires the assistance of a psychiatrist in the trial of an 
indigent defendant with a substantial insanity defense. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 
68, 78-79 (1985). 
74. For example, many cases have employed the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis 
to determine the scope of due process rights which must be accorded to incarcerat-
ed persons. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (conditions of confine-
ment imposed upon pretrial detainees); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) 
(procedures applicable to treatment of mentally ill prisoners with antipsychotic 
drugs against their will). The Mathews v. Eldridge test was also applied to deter-
mine what process was due prior to the suspension of a driver's license because of 
refusal to take a breath-analysis test upon arrest for drunken driving. Mackey v. 
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979). An individual has a substantial protected "property" 
interest in retaining a driver's license. Id. at 10-11. 
75. Nadine Stossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting 
the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1173, 1184-86 (1988); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of 
Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 972-95 (1987). 
76. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 776-77 (1964); Stos-
sen, supra note 75, at 1184-86. See also Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Fourth Amendment 
Implications of Urine Testing For Evidence of Drug Use in Probation, 55 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1159, 1200 (1990). 
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about the accuracy of a proceeding, looking only toward what 
the ultimate impact the protection will have on the outcome of 
the proceeding. 77 In this view, the Mathews v. Eldridge test 
reflects the Supreme Court's "almost exclusively instrumental 
vision" in deciding the proper role for due process 
protections. 78 This ignores the importance of the "intrinsic" 
due process principles of insuring the opportunity to participate 
in governmental actions that adversely affect an individual, 
and other values inherent in fair treatment by the govern-
ment.79 
A second critique of the Mathews v. Eldridge test is that it 
is too blunt an instrument, because it seeks to quantify factors 
that cannot be quantified and eliminates from consideration 
unquantifiable factors that may be the most important factors 
in the core concept of procedural fairness. 80 Mathews v. 
Eldridge has also been criticized, by then-Associate Justice 
Rehnquist, on the general ground, cited above, that it involves 
an essentially unprincipled, ad hoc weighing of interests.81 
The area of pretrial drug testing offers a useful vantage 
point to evaluate these criticisms. Insuring the reliability of 
drug testing results under the due process clause would seem 
to involve essentially instrumental judgments, which the 
Mathews v. Eldridge equation was designed to resolve. This 
article considers how useful the equation is in resolving the 
scope of due process protections. 82 
77. Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 793-94 
(1990). 
78. LAURENCE H. TRIRE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at 671 (2d ed. 
1988). 
79. ld. at 674 (instrumental approach not only overlooks the important human 
interest "in receiving decent treatment, but also provides the Court a facile means 
to justify the most cursory procedures by altering the relative weights to be 
accorded each of the three factors"). 
80. Professor Mashaw has argued that the Mathews v. Eldridge test "tends, as 
cost-benefit analyses typically do, to 'dwarf soft variables' and to ignore complex-
ities and ambiguities." Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Cal-
culus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in 
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 48 (1976). 
81. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 562 (1985) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The balance is simply an ad hoc weighing which 
depends to a great extent upon how the Court subjectively views the underlying 
interests at stake."). 
82. See discussion infra part VII. 
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IV. DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS APPLY TO PRETRIAL DRUG 
TESTING 
The first question to be addressed is whether due process 
protections apply at all to pretrial drug testing. Clearly such 
protections do apply, because pretrial drug testing involves 
fundamental "liberty" interests.83 
The overriding liberty interest involved is that of not being 
incarcerated as a result of a judicial proceeding. Every individ-
ual who tests positive for drugs, prior to the initial hearing, or 
while on pretrial release, runs the risk of incarceration as a 
result. 
The Supreme Court has often held that incarceration in-
fringes the most fundamental and basic "liberty" interest pro-
tected by due process. 84 The Court has specifically found that 
due process protections apply to the decision made at the initial 
bail hearing to release or detain both adults and juveniles 
without bond.85 Indeed, even persons on probation and parole 
have a "liberty" interest in their "conditional freedom" which 
requires due process protections. 86 Persons who have been 
confined in jail prior to trial also have a continuing "liberty" 
interest which requires due process protections relating to the 
conditions of their confinement.87 Protected liberty or property 
interests have also been found to require due process 
protections for far less severe sanctions than incarceration.88 
Incarceration is the harshest sanction that can be imposed 
83. It would be possible to make an attenuated argument that "property" 
interests are also involved in the potential loss of pretrial liberty as a result of 
drug testing. Cf Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("Pretrial confinement 
may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family 
relationships."). However, this would serve little purpose because the "liberty" 
interest is so clear. 
84. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977); Board of Regents v. Roth, 
408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). 
85. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 
U.S. 253, 274-77 (1984). 
86. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation). 
87. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 530 (1979) (approving conditions of confine-
ment imposed on federal pretrial detainees, including body-cavity searches, as 
satisfying due process standards). 
88. For example, corporal punishment in public schools implicates a protected 
liberty interest, Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672. Even loss of a driver's license impli-
cates a protected property interest requiring due process protections. Mackey v. 
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1979). 
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on an individual in the District of Columbia. The District does 
not have laws authorizing capital punishment,89 and there is 
no provision in the District's laws for sentencing an individual 
to prison with aggravating conditions, such as imprisonment at 
"hard labor." Thus, a period of incarceration is the harshest 
penalty that can be imposed.90 Pretrial incarceration is espe-
cially onerous, not only because of its drastic impact on the 
defendant's freedom, but also because it often has a substantial 
impact on the defendant's ability to assist in his or her de-
fense.91 
Even if incarceration is not imposed as a result of a posi-
tive drug test, the judicial officer at the initial hearing routine-
ly imposes some other substantial restraint on liberty, such as 
the requirement that the defendant return every week to pro-
vide a urine sample at the courthouse. A recent study has 
shown that if a defendant was reported to have tested positive 
at the initial hearing, the judicial officer in the District will 
condition release on compliance with regular drug testing pro-
cedures '"all" or "almost all" of the time. 92 
89. Capital punishment was eliminated in the District in 1981, see D.C. Law 3-
113, § 2, 27 D.C. Reg. 5624 (Feb. 26, 1981) (amending D.C. CoDE ANN. § 22-2404 
(1973)), to provide for the current mandatory penalty of 20 years to life imprison-
ment for first degree murder. See generally United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 
1333, 1365 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976) (imposing life-imprison-
ment for felony murder). 
90. Defendants incarcerated by a D.C Superior Court judge can be detained in 
the jail facility located in the District, in one of several correctional facilities 
located in nearby Lorton, Virginia, or in local jails in states as far away as Wash-
ington State (on a contractual basis). The determination of where each defendant 
will be placed is generally made by the D.C. Department of Corrections. The 
determination of when a defendant shall be released on parole is usually made by 
the D.C. Board of Parole (for sentences longer than 180 days). See D.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 24-208 (1989). 
91. The defendant who has been detained pretrial has been "hindered in his 
ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense." 
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972); see also Campbell v. McGruder, 580 
F.2d 521, 531-32 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting the "disturbing evidence" that the defen-
dant at liberty pending trial is more likely to be found not guilty, and if convicted, 
of not receiving a prison sentence). 
92. TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 22-23. There are limited circum-
stances where a documented history of positive drug test results could be beneficial 
to a defendant, such as in qualifying for the so-called "addict exception" at sentenc-
ing. This allows the judge to waive stiff mandatory minimum sentences for certain 
offenses if the defendant was "addicted" to drugs when the offense was committed, 
and if other conditions are satisfied. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(c)(2) (1989), and 
supra note 29. A documented positive test result on the date of arrest (and even 
thereafter) could substantially assist the defendant in establishing an addiction to 
drugs. 
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Another "liberty" interest implicated by drug testing is the 
stigmatizing consequences such testing can have on an 
individual's reputation.93 Two types of stigmatization are in-
volved. First, there is the stigma of being labeled a drug user 
in an official court file. This court file is a public record 
available to any person upon request, including prospective 
employers and government officials who are conducting a check 
on the defendant, even after the case is concluded.94 This stig-
matizing effect of a positive drug test could be eliminated if the 
test results were not included in the written PSA report but 
were instead provided to the judicial officer orally by the PSA 
representative. This is not now done in the District.95 A sec-
However, the defendant has several other ways of documenting an addiction 
which do not pose the risks created by pretrial drug testing, particularly the 
punitive sanctions that may be imposed on the addicted defendant pretrial. These 
include letters or reports from drug programs to which the defendant has been 
referred, testimony by family members or others associated with the defendant's 
addiction, the defendant's prior criminal arrest records, and the defendant's own 
testimony. 
93. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (stigma of being 
publicly labeled as an excessive drinker in notices placed in state liquor stores); 
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
573 (1972); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (stigmatizing consequences of 
the transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital). 
94. Most persons would equate a positive drug test result with being a drug 
user. The PSA report, which is included in the official case jacket in court, speci-
fies that the defendant tested positive or negative for drugs, but it does not specify 
the specific drug or drugs for which the defendant tested positive. 
This lack of specificity as to which drug caused the positive result does not 
offer any substantial protection to the defendant, because the defendant is still 
labeled and stigmatized as a user of illegal drugs. Cf. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 
437 (stigmatization occurred when "unsavory label" of being an excessive drinker 
placed on individual by state officials). But see Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 
441-44 (1960) (no violation of liberty interests for stigmatizing consequences of 
government agency report). 
95. Without much difficulty, the PSA representative could orally inform the 
judicial officer at the initial hearing of the drug test results. This could be done at 
the bench, in the presence of defense counsel and the prosecutor, as is now done 
for any record of juvenile adjudications of the defendant known to PSA. Alterna-
tively, the drug test results could be submitted on a supplemental PSA report, 
which would not become part of the official case file. This system is followed now 
for informing the trial judge of the results of all drug testing which occurs after 
the initial hearing. The report is submitted in writing to the trial court, with 
copies to defense counsel and the prosecutor, but is generally not placed in the 
official court file, although it may be retained in the judge's private file on the 
case in the judge's chambers. See TOBORG & BELLASSAJ, supra note 15, at 25. 
The Supreme Court has indicated in connection with the stigma that can flow 
from a juvenile proceeding: "The more comprehensive and effective the procedures 
used to prevent public disclosure of the finding, the less the danger of stigma." In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, ::l67 n.5 (1970). The same principle would also apply to 
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ond type of stigmatization is that which results from the incar-
ceration or conviction of a defendant based upon a positive 
drug test.96 
These stigmatizing effects of drug testing,97 considered in 
conjunction with the other "liberty" interests involved, clearly 
require that due process protections apply to pretrial drug 
testing programs. The next question is what process is due to 
insure the reliability of pretrial drug testing. 
V. THE NEED TO CONFIRM EMIT TESTS 
The principal due process issue raised by the District's 
pretrial drug testing program is whether a positive result on 
the EMIT screening test must be confirmed by a more reliable 
confirmation test. There have been no reported court decisions 
on this issue,98 but there have been a large number of cases 
(and much controversy) concerning the need to confirm initial 
screening tests such as EMIT in related contexts, including 
probation revocation, prison disciplinary proceedings, and loss 
of employment. 
An analysis of confirmatory testing should begin, not by 
addressing the abstract issue of whether confirmation is re-
quired of pretrial drug testing, but instead by focusing on four 
specific circumstances where confirmation may or may not be 
required, i.e., in contempt proceedings, in hearings to modify 
conditions of release, at the initial bail hearing, and at sentenc-
ing. Mter each of these situations is analyzed separately, con-
sideration can then be given to the similarities and differences 
pretrial drug testing results. 
96. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. 
97. The individual facing the greatest threat of stigmatization is the person 
facing a show cause hearing for contempt as the result of a positive drug test. Not 
only does this individual face up to six months incarceration and a fine, but also a 
permanent record of a conviction for criminal contempt of court. See supra text 
accompanying notes 33-35. Even though pretrial incarceration in D.C. Superior 
Court infrequently lasts in excess of six months, the additional sanction of a 
permanent criminal record would appear to make a contempt conviction the great-
est threat to hberty interests posed by pretrial drug testing. 
98. In one recent case in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the princi-
pal issue was whether due process requires confirmation of EMIT tests in contempt 
proceedings. However, the Court never reached this issue because the United 
States conceded error on an alternative ground r~Jised in the appeal, and the Court 
vacated the contempt conviction on this basis. Henderson v. United States, No. 88-
155 (D.C. Jan. 18, 1989) (mem.) (granting motion to remand filed by the United 
States on Jan. 11, 1989). The author of this article was counsel for Mr. Henderson 
in that case. 
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in these circumstances, in an attempt to formulate a general 
rule indicating when confirmation is required by due process. 
A. Contempt Proceedings 
1. Applying Mathews v. Eldridge 
Contempt proceedings provide the most compelling context 
for confirmation of EMIT tests. Applying the Mathews v. 
Eldridge equation, the first factor to be considered is the 
defendant's interests. Here, there can be no question that the 
defendant's fundamental liberty interests in freedom from in-
carceration and stigmatization are entitled to great weight. 99 
The Supreme Court has indicated that the defendant's interest 
in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding is "almost uniquely 
compelling."100 
On the other side of the equation is the government's inter-
est in minimizing the fiscal burden that confirmation of posi-
tive drug tests imposes. In these days when most court sys-
tems, including the District's, are operating on tight bud-
gets, 101 any additional expenditure of funds is a matter of 
concern. However, the cost of confirming drug tests used in con-
tern pt proceedings is de minimis com pared to overall pretrial 
99. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) ("[T]he juvenile's countervailing 
interest in freedom from institutional restraints, even for the brief time involved 
here, is undoubtedly substantial."); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 
(1987) ("On the other side of the scale, of course, is the individual's strong interest 
in liberty. We do not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of this 
right."). 
While the length of the period of incarceration may effect the weight of defend-
ant's interests, even a "brief" period of incarceration involves "undoubtedly substan-
tial" interests. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. at 265; cf Mackey v. Montrym, 44:3 U.S. 
1, 12 (1979) ("The duration of any potentially wrongful deprivation of a property 
interest is an important factor in assessing the impact of official action."). The 
defendant convicted of criminal contempt for drug use faces a substantial period of 
incarceration of up to six months. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
The defendant's interest in avoiding the stigma of a permanent conviction re-
cord for criminal contempt is similarly compelling. 
100. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78 (1985). The Court commented that: 
!d. 
The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that 
places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling. 
Indeed, the host of safeguards fashioned by this Court over the years to 
diminish the risk of erroneous conviction stands as a testament to that 
concern. The interest of the individual in the outcome of the State's effort 
to overcome the presumption of innocence is obvious and weighs heavily 
in our analysis. 
101. CARVEH, supra note 1, at 6. 
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drug testing costs. It is likely that there will be only a relative 
handful of contempt proceedings that require confirmatory 
testing, because Superior Court judges rarely initiate contempt 
proceedings for violation of conditions of release, preferring the 
less drastic and procedurally simpler options available to 
thP-m. 102 For the small number of show cause hearings initiat-
ed on the basis of positive drug tests, the great majority of de-
fendants concede drug use, 103 thereby eliminating any need to 
confirm these tests (since the defendants have "confirmed" 
them). 104 Indeed, using reliable confirmation tests may actu-
ally decrease the number of defendants who contest positive 
EMIT results, because they know they will be faced with re-
sults of tests which are virtually foolproof. 
The number of drug tests involved in contested show cause 
hearings are only a very small fraction of the drug tests admin-
istered by PSA, 105 and the expense of confirming these posi-
tive tests with state-of-the-art confirmation tests would not be 
great. 106 Such confirmation could be done "without prohibitive 
102. TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 25. 
103. TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 42, at 8. 
104. There is no need to confirm positive drug tests if the defendant admits use 
and doesn't challenge the accuracy of the result. See In re Johnston, 745 P.2d 864, 
865 (Wash. 1987) (en bane); Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226, 232 (W.D. Ky. 
1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 
1989). 
105. The potential financial burden of confirmation testing includes not only the 
cost of the confirmation test itself, but any additional expense involved in retaining 
and storing urine samples for possible later re-testing. 
Of course, if the defendant assumes the responsibility for paying all the ex-
penses involved in the confirmation test, the government would have little (if any) 
interest in opposing such confirmation. However, this is not an available alterna-
tive in the overwhelming majority of cases in D.C. Superior Court, which involve 
indigent defendants. In these cases, confirmation must be done at government 
expense if it is done at all. 
106. It costs PSA less than $3 to test each sample today; when the District's 
program began, it cost approximately $7 to test each sample. Conversation with 
John Carver, Director of the District of Columbia Pretrial Services Agency (1991); 
CARVER, supra note 1, at 6. Confirmation using the most reliable testing method 
(GC/MS) costs between $25 and $80, depending on the laboratory involved, and 
there would likely be a discount on this price based upon a contract with a labora-
tory for bulk amounts of confirmation tests. See JOHN CLARK, ESTIMATING THE 
COSTS OF DRUG TESTING FOR A PRETRIAL SERVICES PROGRAM (1989) (cost of 
GC/MS confirmation was $25 per test for the Multnomah County, Oregon, pretrial 
drug testing progtam); Kaye McDonald Sutherland & Coni Rathbone, Jar Wars: 
Drug Testing in the Workplace, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 529, 540 n.99 (1987); 
Alexander Stille, DRUG TESTING: The Scene is Set For a Dramatic Legal Colli-
sion Between the Rights of Employers and Workers, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 23; 
Charles E. Leal, Comment, Admissibility of Biochemical Urinalysis Testing Results 
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cost" to the PSA program. 107 
The governmental interests balanced as part of the 
Mathews v. Eldridge equation are only those involved with 
providing an additional confirmatory test, not interests served 
by drug testing generally. These general governmental inter-
ests would have been considered under the old one-step due 
process balancing test108 (and under the current Fourth 
Amendment balancing test), but the Mathews v. Eldridge test 
focuses only on the burdens involved with the additional proce-
dural protections in dispute. 
Thus, while the government has an obvious and substan-
tial interest in insuring that defendants comply with court-
ordered conditions of release, especially those requiring the 
For the Purpose of Detecting Marijuana Use, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 396-97 
(1984). 
The cost of confirming positive results is also very small compared to the total 
costs involved in a pretrial drug testing program. For example, the pilot demon-
stration pretrial drug testing program established in eight federal judicial districts 
in 1989 used an initial immunoassay screening test, and confirmation at an outside 
laboratory using GC or an equivalent technique if any adverse action was to be 
taken against a defendant. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-2. The costs to set up 
and operate the immunoassay testing was $845,520, and the cost of confirmation 
testing was only $21,000 (less than 2.5 percent of the total costs). ld. at 8. This 
report also contained cost projections for nationwide implementation of pretrial 
drug testing in all federal district courts. According to one model for such nation-
wide implementation, the initial costs to set up the program would be $6,865,000, 
the recurring costs would be $10,801,037, but the cost of laboratory confirmation 
would be only $90,000 per year. ld. at 63-64. Confirmation costs would thus be 
less than one percent of all recurring costs. 
Similar estimates of costs were made for state pretrial drug testing programs 
in CLARK, supra. According to one model, the yearly cost for a pretrial testing 
program was in excess of $818,000, of which only $15,750 was for confirmation of 
positive drug test results by GC/MS whenever the defendant's release could be 
revoked on the basis of a positive drug test. ld. at 14-17. Confirmation costs were 
less than 2% under this model. 
107. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). The Supreme Court has also used 
other formulations to indicate the role of costs in determining the scope of consti-
tutional protections. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 480 U.S. 817, 825 (1977) ("[T]he 
cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial."); Ingraham 
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 680 (1977) ("[E]ven if the need for advance procedural 
safeguards were clear, the question would remain whether the incremental benefit 
would justify the cost."). See generally TRIBE, supra note 78, at 715-16. 
108. Under the procedure announced in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union 
v. McElroy, 867 U.S. 886 (1961), the court would have weighed the importance to 
the government of having drug testing against the interests of the defendant in 
not wrongfully having his or her liberty restrained as a result of a testing error. 
Under the newer procedure, the court is to weigh the burden on the government of 
providing the additional confirmatory test against the estimated wrongful loss to 
the individual of his or her liberty resulting from a mistake correctable by the 
confirmatory test. 
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defendant not to violate the law while on pretrial release, this 
interest is not relevant to the question of whether due process 
requires confirmation of EMIT tests. 
The government also has a strong interest in insuring that 
defendants with pending cases do not use illicit drugs while 
free on pretrial release because such drug use could affect the 
defendant's ability to appear in court, or threaten the safety of 
the community. There is a growing, but still inconclusive, body 
of empirical data documenting the relationship between pretri-
al drug use and both failure to appear, and commission of new 
offenses by defendants while on pretrial release. 109 While the 
causal relationships between drug use and failure to appear or 
commission of new offenses is still subject to vigorous scholarly 
debate, 110 the Supreme Court has made it clear that a defini-
tive answer is not necessary before these government interests 
can be factored into a Fourth Amendment analysis. 111 
Sufficient data currently exists to enable the government 
to appropriately assert these interests in the Fourth Amend-
ment context. Indeed, the government's interest in seeking to 
protect the public health and safety has traditionally been 
accorded great weight. 112 These interests are not, however, 
109. See studies cited in Abell, supra note 1, at 944, 950-51 & n.6; Rosen & 
Goldkamp, supra note 10, at 114-15 & ns. 2-4; John S. Goldkamp et a!., Pretrial 
Drug Testing and Defendant Risk, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 585, 586-87, 590-
99 (1990). 
110. Compare Goldkamp et al., supra note 109, and Rosen & Goldkamp, supra 
note 10, with Abell, supra note 1, and CARVER, supra note 1. 
111. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). 
[A)ppellees claim, and the District Court agreed, that it is virtually 
impossible to predict future criminal conduct with any degree of accura-
cy . . . . Our cases indicate, however, that from a legal point of view 
there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future crim-
inal conduct. Such a judgement forms an important element in many 
decisions .... 
!d., 467 U.S. at 278 (footnote omitted). 
112. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (removing drunken drivers from 
the highways). 
A number of thoughtful commentators have recently challenged the wisdom of 
using criminal laws to control America's serious drug abuse problem, and have 
suggested alternative approaches, including legalization and decriminalization of 
drugs. These commentators include United States District Judge Robert W. Sweet 
and former Secretary of State George P. Shultz. See DRUG POLICY FOUNDATION, 
DRUG PROHIBITION AND THE CONSCIENCE OF NATIONS 24-25, 205-08 (Arnold S. 
Trebach & Kevin B. Zeese eds., 1990). However, as long as criminal laws against 
illicit drug use remain in effect, the government can certainly assert a substantial 
interest in their enforcement in appropriate contexts (such as the search and sei-
zure area), but not in support of a policy which unfairly imprisons innocent people 
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relevant to the due process concern over confirmation of EMIT 
tests. 
The defendant's appearance in court and the protection of 
the public are not the only relevant government interests. The 
government, like the defendant, also has a compelling interest 
in insuring the accuracy of criminal dispositions. Unlike private 
litigants, the government's interest in prevailing at trial is 
"necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate 
adjudication of criminal cases."113 Moreover, the government 
has an interest in insuring that the program is perceived as 
fair, and not an error-prone system resulting in unjustified 
jailing. These governmental interests further support the need 
for confirmation testing. 
Final factors to be considered in the Mathews v. Eldridge 
equation are the risk of an erroneous determination using only 
the EMIT test, and the increased reliability that would result 
from confirmation testing. There is agreement in the scientific 
community that confirmation of immunoassays like EMIT with 
GC/MS results in reliability exceeding 99.9 percent, when prop-
er procedures are followed. 114 In other words, confirmation of 
positive EMIT results with GC/MS virtually eliminates accura-
cy concerns. With such confirmation courts can confidently 
equate positive drug test results with drug usage. 
When an EMIT test is unconfirmed, courts do not enjoy 
such confidence because the margin of error for unconfirmed 
EMIT tests is subject to frequent dispute. As noted above, 
some authorities claim that false positive rates for unconfirmed 
EMIT tests range from two to five percent. Other studies of 
EMIT testing programs have shown far higher false positive 
rates. 115 While the precise rate of false positives in the 
District's program has apparently never been determined nor 
simply to save a relatively small amount of money. 
113. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
U.S. 4 71, 484 (1972) (noting the state's interest in "not having parole revoked 
because of erroneous information"). 
114. See VJSHER & MCFADDEN, supra note 51, at 3; American Fed'n of Gov. 
Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 729 (S.D. Ga. 1986); Mark Rust, Drug 
Testing: The Legal Dilemma, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1986, at 52; John Edward Failla, 
Note, A Proposal for Mandatory Drug Testing of Federal Civilian Employees, 62 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 322, 330 n.65 (1987). 
115. See supra note 62, showing false positive rates in published studies of up 
to 25% by the New Jersey Department of Corrections; 28% in the study by Black 
et a!.; 34% in the study by Jones et a!.; and 38% in the Center for Human Toxi-
cology study. 
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publicly reported, 116 even assuming a five percent false posi-
tive rate, one of every twenty persons convicted of a drug-use 
violation would have been wrongly convicted. This would con-
stitute a substantial and unnecessary number of persons who 
have been wrongfully convicted of criminal contempt. 
Application of the Mathews v. Eldridge test leads to the 
conclusion that due process requires confirmation of positive 
EMIT tests in contested contempt proceedings. The defendant's 
interests clearly outweigh the government's. Moreover, the 
cost/benefit considerations strongly favor confirmatory testing, 
which substantially increases reliability (virtual error-free test 
results) at a relatively nominal expense. 
2. Other Important Factors 
While the Mathews v. Eldridge equation identifies several 
obviously important factors in determining whether EMIT tests 
must be confirmed, it ignores other factors essential to resolv-
ing the confirmation issue. 
a. Burden of Proof The first factor is the burden of proof 
involved in the proceeding. In contempt hearings, the govern-
ment must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 117 Thus, in contested contempt proceedings, the issue 
is whether unconfirmed EMIT tests are sufficiently reliable to 
prove drug use beyond a reasonable doubt (the highest stan-
dard of proof in American law). 
This heavy burden of proof is the principal distinction 
between the need for confirmation in contempt proceedings and 
several cases which have not required confirmation of EMIT 
tests in prison disciplinary proceedings. In prison disciplinary 
hearings, where due process rights are quite limited, 118 the 
116. The sloppy procedures documented in United States v. Roy 114 DAILY 
WASH. L. REP. 2481, 2488 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 1986), make it questionable 
whether the District's testing program approaches a 95 percent accuracy rate. See 
supra note 59. The reliability of the District's program probably improved after 
October 1989, when a toxicological chemist was hired as the full-time Director of 
the court's drug testing laboratory. 
117. The reasonable-doubt standard is "a prime instrument for reducing the risk 
of convictions resting on factual error." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). 
Due process requires the government to introduce reliable evidence proving guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt in all criminal proceedings and juvenile adjudications 
which are analogous to criminal proceedings. !d. at 364; see In re Thompson, 454 
A.2d 1324 (D.C. 1982). 
118. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); Superintendent v. Hill, 
472 U.S. 445, 4fifi (19Xfi) 
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evidentiary requirements of due process are satisfied if there is 
"any evidence" to support the prison official's disciplinary de-
termination.119 Not surprisingly, a number of courts have up-
held the use of unconfirmed EMIT tests in prison disciplinary 
proceedings because these tests provide "some evidence" of drug 
use. 120 This very low evidentiary standard, however, is dia-
metrically opposite the reasonable-doubt standard involved in 
119. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985). In Hill the Court noted: 
Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require exam-
ination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of 
witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the relevant question is 
whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclu-
sion reached by the disciplinary board. We decline to adopt a more strin-
gent evidentiary standard as a constitutional requirement (emphasis add-
ed). 
!d., 472 U.S. at 455-56. 
120. See Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1986) (double EMIT); 
Peranzo v. Coughlin, 850 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (double EMIT); 
Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1989) (double EMIT); Lahey v. Kelly, 518 
N.E.2d 924 (N.Y. 1987) (double EMIT); In re Johnston, 745 P.2d 864, 867-68 
(Wash. 1987) (single EMIT); Pella v. Adams, 702 F. Supp. 244 (D. Nev. 1988) 
(double EMIT); Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35 (D.N.D. 1984) (single EMIT which 
can be confirmed); Works v. State, 575 So. 2d 622 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (double 
EMIT); Driver v. State, 576 So.2d 675 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (double EMIT). As 
the court stated in In re Johnston: 
[The prisoners] refer to a New Jersey Department of Corrections 
study, cited in Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1511, which found the single 
EMIT test to be 75 percent accurate. This discrepancy in findings would 
be troubling in the context of a criminal trial, in which the State bears 
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has 
used illegal drugs. In light of the lesser evidentiary standards applicable 
in prison disciplinary hearings, we deem these differences immaterial. 
In re Johnston, 745 P.2d 864, 868 (Wash. 1987). 
However, there is limited authority requiring confirmation of EMIT tests by 
alternative methodologies in prison disciplinary proceedings. See Kane v. Fair, 33 
Crim. L. Rep. (CCH) 2492 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1983), and Johnson v. Walton, 
No. 561-84 Rm (Rutland Vt. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1985). In Kane, the court 
preliminarily enjoined Massachusetts correctional officials from introducing 
unconfirmed EMIT tests into evidence in inmate disciplinary hearings. The court 
focused on the punitive measures that flowed from a positive EMIT test, and the 
adverse impact such a test could have on an inmate's chance for parole. 
Similarly, in Johnson v. Walton, the court ruled that correctional officials in 
Vermont violated the due process rights of inmates by using unconfirmed EMIT 
test results in inmate disciplinary proceedings. The court required EMIT tests to 
be confirmed by a different and more reliable confirmatory test procedure. Kane v. 
Fair and Johnson v. Walton are discussed in Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226, 
230-31 (W.D. Ky. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d 
443 (6th Cir. 1989); see also In re Johnston, 745 P.2d 864, 869-70 (Wash. 1987) 
(opinion of Justices Utter and Dore dissenting in part); ZEESE, supra note 10, at § 
8.07. 
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contempt proceedings. 121 
b. Focus of the Decision. The second factor which merits 
consideration is that the drug test result is the sole focus of the 
contempt hearing. It is not just one of many considerations 
which comprise decisions such as bail and sentencing. Because 
the drug test result is the only issue in the contempt hearing, 
it is that much more important that they be accurate and reli-
able. 
c. Nature of the Decision. The third important factor is 
the nature of the decision involved. The contempt decision is 
basically a retrospective decision that determines whether a 
defendant violated release conditions by using drugs. The bail 
decision, by contrast, is basically a prospective decision which 
attempts to predict future conduct based upon the drug test 
result and other factors. The Supreme Court has employed this 
distinction in its rulings that parole revocation proceedings 
automatically trigger due process protections, but parole re-
lease decisions do not (although specific parole statutes may 
create such protections). 122 Because the nature of the decision 
in criminal contempt proceedings is analogous to that in parole 
revocation proceedings, due process requires confirmation of 
EMIT tests in contempt proceedings. 
d. Confirmation Required in Other Contexts. The fourth 
and final factor which should be considered, in addition to the 
121. For an analysis of burdens of proof, see John Kaplan, Decision Theory and 
the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1071-77 (1968); cf John S. 
Goldkamp, Danger and Detention: A Second Generation of Bail Reform, 76 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMIMOLOGY 1, 33-40 (1985). 
122. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court held that 
the parole-revocation determination must comply with due process standards. The 
Court noted that the first step in the revocation decision involves "a wholly retro-
spective factual question," i.e., whether there was a violation of parole. !d. at 479. 
In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 
(1979), the Court held that the parole-release determination does not involve 
inherent due process rights, but such rights may be created by statute. The Court 
distinguished Morrissey on the ground that parole-release decisions often involve 
"no more than informed predictions," !d. at 10, quoting from Meachum v. Fano, 
427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). The dissenting opinions in Greenholtz severely criticized 
this distinction. See 442 U.S. at 18-20 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting in 
part); 442 U.S. at 23-25 (Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens, J.J., dissenting in part). 
The Greenholtz distinction is similar to the older administrative due process 
cases that recognized a due process right to a hearing when the issue involved 
retrospective, adjudicative-type factual questions, but rejected the right to a hearing 
when the issue involved predictive, legislative-type factual questions. See. e.g., Bi-
Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915); Londoner v. 
Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). 
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Mathews v. Eldridge formula, is whether confirmation of EMIT 
tests is generally required in other contexts. This factor has 
been an important consideration in several recent due process 
cases. 123 
Confirmatory tests are required for the great majority of 
all drug testing done today. This reflects a consensus of legal, 
scholarly, and law enforcement authorities that such confirma-
tion is appropriate and necessary before a sanction can be im-
posed on an individual. At the federal level, the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services has issued Manda-
tory Guidelines for Federal Workplace Drug Testing Pro-
grams, 124 which apply to almost every federal agency, with 
certain listed exceptions such as the Armed Forces. 125 These 
Guidelines require two levels of testing: First, an initial test 
using an "immunoassay screen to eliminate 'negative' urine 
specimens from further consideration";126 and second, a con-
firmation test using state-of-the-art GC/MS. 127 These federal 
guidelines are an excellent model for courts to consider. 128 
123. See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984): "The fact that a practice is 
followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether 
that practice accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering ... ." 
ld. at 268, quoting from Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952). In Ake v. 
Oklahoma the Court noted the following: 
Oklahoma asserts that to provide Ake with psychiatric assistance on 
the record before us would result in a staggering burden to the 
State .... We are unpersuaded by this assertion. Many States, as well 
as the Federal Cklvernment, currently make psychiatric assistance avail-
able to indigent defendants, and they have not found the financial burden 
so great as to preclude this assistance. 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1985). 
124. 53 Fed. Reg. 11970-89 (April 11, 1988). 
125. ld. at 11979 § 1.1. 
126. ld. at 11980 § 1.2. 
127. ld. at 11979-80 § 1.2. Section 1.2 provides: 
!d. 
Confirmatory Test. A second analytical procedure to identify the pres-
ence of a specific drug or metabolite which is independent of the initial 
test and which uses a different technique and chemical principle from 
that of the initial test in order to ensure reliability and accuracy. (At this 
time gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) is the only autho-
rized confirmation method for cocaine, marijuana, opiates, amphetamines, 
and phencyclidine.) 
128. Other key provisions of the Guidelines require protections not now required 
in the Superior Court's drug detection program. These include retention of positive 
samples in storage for one year for any necessary re-testing, 53 Fed. Reg. at 11984 
§ 2.4(h), and quality control procedures, including blind performance testing, 53 
Fed. Reg. at 11984-85, § 2.5. 
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The Armed Forces, though exempt from these Guidelines, 
have long required confirmation of a positive immunoassay test 
by another, more reliable testing procedure before an adverse 
action is taken against a member of the Armed Forces. 129 The 
Federal Bureau of Prisons also requires validation of a positive 
immunoassay test by persons serving sentences in contract 
community treatment centers. 13° Furthermore, the American 
Probation and Parole Association has recently published guide-
lines for drug testing that require confirmation of initial 
screening tests with GC/MS when an individual denies use and 
the drug test will be used as "the primary evidence in a revoca-
tion hearing."131 
It IS also significant that the Drug Enforcement 
Administration's Mid-Atlantic Laboratory, which tests all the 
drugs involved in D.C. Superior Court drug cases, always con-
firms an initial positive drug test result. 132 Given these con-
firmation procedures, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
has repeatedly recognized the general reliability of the DEA 
laboratory's test results. 133 The PSA's drug detection pro-
grams, which do not require confirmation by a different testing 
procedure, stand in stark contrast. 
Moreover, a number of states have recently passed statutes 
requiring that employers who test their employees for drug use 
have a procedure which confirms an initial positive result with 
a second laboratory test using a different procedure before any 
disciplinary action is taken. 134 Even in states that have not 
129. Kevin B. Zeese, Marijuana Urinalysis Tests, 1 DRUG L. REP. 25 (1983). The 
Armed Forces perform the largest number of urine tests of any organization in this 
country. ld. 
130. 28 C.F.R. § 550.42(c) (1991). There is no analogous requirement for valida-
tion of positive drug test results for other federal inmates. See 28 C.F.R. § 
550.30(b) (1991). 
131. U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., AMERICAN PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION'S 
DRUG TESTING GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES FOR ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
AGENCIES § 6-7, at 23 (1991). These guidelines also provide that less rigorous 
confirmation techniques may be acceptable when the test result will be used only 
to confront the offender, for treatment monitoring, or for minor in-house disciplin-
ary actions. ld. at 21, 23. 
132. For example, the DEA laboratory first tests for PCP using the thin-layer 
chromatography (TLC) test, and then confirms a positive result with mass spec-
trometry (MS). Similarly, for marijuana the DEA laboratory uses the Duquenois-
Levine color test, followed by microscopic examination and confirmation by TLC. 
See, e.g., the DEA chemist's testimony in trial transcript of October 29, 1984, at 
70-77, United States v. Leon Davis, Crim. No. M16240-83 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1984). 
133. Berry v. United States, 528 A.2d 1209 (D.C. 1987); Howard v. United 
States, 473 A.2d 835 (D.C. 1984). 
134. Shala Mills Bannister, Comment, Drug Testing Legislation: What Are the 
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yet passed these statutes, there are many state agencies that 
now require confirmation of immunoassay screening tests with 
a more reliable testing procedure. 135 Such confirmation is 
even more appropriate in the criminal justice context. 136 
That confirmation by an alternative test is not financially 
impractical is underscored by the fact that all federal agencies, 
the Armed Forces, many states, and even the DEA laboratory 
for drug cases in Superior Court require it. Confirmation by an 
alternative test is both recommended by the manufacturer of 
the EMIT test in the packaging instruction, 137 it is also sup-
ported by an overwhelming consensus of the scientific commu-
nity. las 
States Doing? 36 KAN. L. REV. 919, 936-37 (1988). 
135. For example, the police department of Newark, New Jersey, requires that a 
positive EMIT test by a recruit be confirmed by GC/MS, Fraternal Order of Police 
v. City of Newark, 524 A.2d 430, 439 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); the police 
and fire departments of East Point, Georgia, require that a police or fire official's 
positive EMIT tests be confirmed by GC/MS, Smith v. City of E. Point, 359 S.E.2d 
692, 693 (Ga. App. Ct. 1987), rev'd on other grounds City of E. Point v. Smith, 365 
S.E.2d 432 (Ga. 1988); the public bus system of Palm Springs, California, requires 
that a positive EMIT test of a bus driver be confirmed by GC/MS or TLC, Amal· 
gamated Transit Union v. Sunline Transit Agency, 663 F. Supp. 1560, 1570 (C.D. 
Cal. 1987); and, the police department of Washington Township, New Jersey, 
requires confirmation of a positive EMIT test by TLC, Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n 
of New Jersey v. Township of Washington, 672 F. Supp. 779, 782 (D.N.J. 1987), 
rev'd on other grounds 850 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1004 
(1989). 
136. An individual's interest in maintaining employment is clearly entitled to 
great weight, and it does not denigrate that interest to recognize that incarceration 
or other court-imposed penal sanctions impinge upon individual liberty interests 
which are entitled to even greater weight. See supra cases cited in notes 99-100. 
Similarly, the stigma resulting from incarceration and the accompanying permanent 
criminal record for contempt of court because of drug abuse, represents a greater 
stigma than that associated with loss of employment. 
137. ZEESE, supra note 10, at 3-36. 
138. Perhaps Dr. Hawks of the National Institute on Drug Abuse put it best: 
The inherent possibility of error in any assay is a matter of concern 
which escalates in proportion to the consequences of the positive result. A 
false positive result occurring once in 100 true positives is insignificant in 
an incidence survey for research purposes. The one false positive is of 
great concern, however, if it is a forensic sample from an individual 
whose freedom, career or civil rights hang in the balance. In forensic 
science, such occurrences are minimized to levels of little concern by the 
use of confirmatory methods of analysis. High confidence can be placed on 
a urine sample which is drug positive by an immunoassay method, such 
as EMIT, if it is also positive by a method based on completely different 
principles, such as GC/MS. 
RICHARD HAWKS, THE METABOLISM, PHARMACOKINETICS AND ANALYSIS OF MARIJUA-
NA COMPONENTS IN BODY FLUIDS: IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-RESEARCH USES (1980), 
quoted in ZEESE, supra note 10, at 3-35. 
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Consideration of these additional factors reinforces the 
conclusion under the Mathews v. Eldridge equation that confir-
mation is required of EMIT tests used in contested contempt 
proceedings in the District of Columbia. 
3. EMIT Court Decisions 
There have been a number of recent federal and state court 
decisions addressing the issue of whether EMIT test results 
must be confirmed before a sanction such as imprisonment, loss 
of employment, or even suspension from school can be imposed 
on an individual. These decisions have been inconsistent, al-
though the most persuasive of these cases support the need for 
such confirmation. 
The United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia has ruled that it is illegal to discharge a school bus atten-
dant on the basis of an unconfirmed EMIT test which purport-
edly showed marijuana use by the attendant. 139 Mter review-
ing at length many scientific authorities and court decisions 
supporting the need to confirm EMIT tests, the court held that 
such action was arbitrary and capricious. 140 The school board 
had argued that the EMIT test had, in fact, been confirmed 
because after the initial EMIT test yielded a positive result, a 
second EMIT test was conducted on the urine sample. 141 This 
is the same type of "confirmation" as is performed by PSA. The 
district court emphatically rejected this argument and ordered 
confirmation by a different and more reliable technique. 142 
The school board appealed only the issue of whether a bus 
attendant could be tested for drugs without probable cause. 
The District of Columbia Circuit ruled that probable cause was 
not required, but the court went on to emphasize in dicta its 
agreement with the district court that an unconfirmed EMIT 
test would not be adequate. 143 
139. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505-06 (D.D.C. 1986). 
140. !d. at 1505-07. 
141. !d. at 1505. 
142. !d. 
143. The court said the following: 
[T]he School System has conceded that the EMIT test is not a valid 
measure of whether the subject is in possession of, is using, or is under 
the influence of illicit drugs at the time of the test. As this test therefore 
lacks a sufficient nexus to the appellant's legitimate concern that its em-
ployees not possess, use or be under the influence of drugs while on duty, 
it is clear that the School System could not constitutionally test its em-
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Another persuasive federal court decision was issued by 
Chief Judge Waters of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Arkansas. 144 Mter analyzing the short-
comings and unreliability of the EMIT test in detail, that court 
ruled that a public school could not expel students based upon 
unconfirmed tests. 145 
These decisions are supported by other recent cases which 
have indicated in dicta that unconfirmed EMIT tests violate 
due process. 146 There have also been several recent decisions 
ployees for drugs in the manner Jones was tested, and our analysis should 
not be read to suggest the contrary (emphasis in original) (footnote omit-
ted). 
Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir.), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds sub nom., Jenkins v. Jones, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989). 
144. Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark.), modified, 663 F. Supp. 149 
(W.D. Ark. 1985). 
145. !d. The court said that: 
[T]he test used bears so little relation to the guilt or innocence of any 
particular student that its use as a determining factor . . . cannot be 
consistent with constitutional requirements. 
* * * 
To impose a sanction as severe as expulsion for the mere presence of 
these urinary metabolites in the body would, in a criminal case, consti-
tute an impermissible punishment . . . . [F]or the reasons discussed 
above, and because of the described deficiencies of the test, the court 
concludes that use of the test is not reasonably related to the mainte-
nance of order and security in the schools nor to the preservation of the 
educational environment and processes. 
!d., 653 F. Supp. at 40. 
146. The most significant of these cases is National Treasury Employees Union 
v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.), affd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
While the principal issue in this case was the Fourth Amendment challenge to the 
Customs Service's compulsory urine testing program, the Court of Appeals clearly 
expressed its view, in dicta, concerning the reliability of unconfirmed EMIT tests: 
Initially, all samples are screened by the enzyme-multiplied-immunoas-
say technique (EMIT). Because EMIT yields a significant rate of positive 
results even in the absence of drug use, all positive samples are then 
screened by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). 
* * * 
The drug-testing program is not so unreliable as to violate due pro-
cess of law. While the initial screening test, EMIT, may have too high a 
rate of false-positive results for the presence of drugs, the union does not 
dispute the evidence that follow-up test, GC/MS, is almost always accu-
rate, assuming proper storage, handling, and measurement techniques. 
!d., 816 F.2d at 181. 
In Harmon v. Auger, 768 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1985), the lower court had de-
clared unlawful a regulation of the Iowa prison system which provided that a posi-
tive result on an EMIT test created an irrebuttable presumption of drug usage by 
an inmate. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the prisoner must be allowed, as a mat-
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upholding the reliability of drug testing procedures only be-
cause positive EMIT tests have been confirmed by more reli-
able tests. 147 
The reliability of unconfirmed EMIT tests has been the 
subject of a substantial amount of litigation in the area of pris-
on disciplinary proceedings. Virtually all of these cases have 
upheld the use of unconfirmed EMIT tests in this context be-
cause of the very limited due process rights of prisoners, and 
the legal standard requiring the court to uphold the disciplin-
ary sanction if there is "any evidence" in the record to support 
it. 148 However, even under this very low standard, two lower 
courts have required confirmation of EMIT tests in prison disci-
plinary proceedings. 149 
There have also been several cases holding that uncon-
firmed EMIT tests can be used in probation revocation proceed-
ings, 150 and that the EMIT test is sufficiently reliable to be 
admissible in other court proceedings. 151 
ter of due process, to challenge the accuracy and reliability of the EMIT test. !d. 
at 276-77. 
147. See Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F. Supp. 1422, 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1987), involving a 
challenge by correctional officers in Cook County, Illinois, to a compulsory urine 
testing program: "The urinalysis program which defendants have implemented, con-
sisting of the EMIT/GCMS chemical analysis procedure, is a highly accurate and 
reliable procedure for detecting the presence of metabolites of cocaine, marijuana 
and heroin or opiates in a sample of urine." See also Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F. 
Supp. 1504, 1512 (D. Ind. 1985) ("Since plaintiffs urine sample has been confirmed 
as positive by the TLC method, the EMIT test has been proven reliable in 
plaintiffs situation."); United States v. Harper, 22 M.J. 157, 161 (C.M.A. 1986) 
(immunoassay test confirmed by mass spectrometry sufficiently reliable); American 
Fed'n of Gov. Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 729 (S.D. Ga. 1986) ("A 
positive EMIT test must be verified through the more expensive gas chromatogra-
phy testing process which, according to testimony given to this Court, is virtually 
100% accurate, assuming that proper chain of custody procedures are followed."); cf 
Adkins v. Martin, 699 F. Supp. 1510, 1513-14 (W.D. Okla. 1988) (prison inmates); 
Brown v. State, 760 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (probation revocation). 
148. See supra note 120. 
149. !d. 
150. People v. Walker, 517 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (double EMIT suffi-
ciently reliable to establish violation of probation by a preponderance of the evi-
dence); State v. Johnson, 527 A.2d 250 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987) (no abuse of discre-
tion for trial court to revoke probation on basis of double EMIT test); Smith v. 
State, 298 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. 1983) (no abuse of discretion for trial court to revoke 
probation on basis of single EMIT test). 
151. See Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1988); cases cited supra note 
43. Compare Isaacks v. State, 646 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (positive 
EMIT test results not admissible when certain testing conditions not met) with 
Bolieu v. State, 779 S.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (not deciding 
whether an uncorroborated positive EMIT test result "was sufficient to support the 
trial court's decision to revoke probation"). 
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There is thus judicial authority for a variety of positions on 
the reliability of the EMIT test and the need to confirm positive 
results with a confirmatory test. 152 However, the most per-
In United States v. Roy, 118 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2317 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Sep. 24, 
1985), Judge Burgess ruled that the EMIT test was admissible in evidence in a 
contempt proceeding in D.C. Superior Court. ld. This decision was made in re-
sponse to a defense motion for judgement of acquittal at the conclusion of the 
government's case, but before presentation of the defense case. Although the court 
denied the defense motion at that time, the defense renewed its motion after all 
the evidence had been introduced, and the court then granted the motion for 
judgement of acquittal. United States v. Roy, 114 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 2481 (D.C. 
Sup. Ct. Oct. 6, 1986). The court indicated that there was a great deal of uncer-
tainty in the contempt hearing record on the amount of time that PCP is retained 
in the body, and as a result the court could not find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant had ingested PCP after (rather than before) he had been placed 
on pretrial release. Id. at 2481, 2491. 
The court further stated that it was "not necessary" for it to decide whether a 
positive EMIT test could "sustain a fmding beyond a reasonable doubt that any 
drug identified by that test was in the body." Id., at 2490. The court's decision 
contains an excellent analysis of the scientific and legal issues involved in the use 
of EMIT tests in contempt proceedings. 
152. Several of the cases cited above have made the serious error of basing their 
rulings on generalized statements as to the accuracy of EMIT tests in the abstract. 
See. e.g., Harmon v. Auger. 768 F.2d 270, 276 (8th Cir. 1985) (EMIT test results 
"about 95% accurate"); Peranzo v. Coughlin, 850 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1988) (double 
EMIT test 98% accurate); Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35 (DN.D. 1984) (single 
EMIT test 97-99% accurate). Putting aside the fact that not even the manufacturer 
of the EMIT test claims such high accuracy rates for its test, these generalized 
statements as to the accuracy of the test miss the fundamental point that the 
accuracy of the test cannot be considered in the abstract, but only in relation to 
the procedures utilized in the specific drug testing program. If proper procedures 
are routinely followed, the accuracy rate of the program will be substantially 
greater than if proper procedures are not routinely followed. The sloppiness of the 
D.C. Superior Court procedures documented in United States v. Roy, 113 DAILY W. 
L. REP. 2317, give cause for concern that the accuracy rate of the D.C. pretrial 
program may be far below the idealized 95-99% accuracy rate referred to in the 
above cases. 
There has also been an attempt to correlate the supposed accuracy rate of the 
EMIT test with numerical probability rates for the different standards of proof. See 
Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504 (S.DN.Y. 1985): "[T)he probabilities associ-
ated "'ith the various standards of proof may be fairly estimated as 50+% for 
preponderance of the evidence, 70% for clear and convincing evidence, above 80% 
for clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, and 95+% for evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 608 F. Supp. at 1512, citing United States v. Fatico, 458 F. 
Supp. 388, 403-04 (E.DN.Y.), affd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 
1073 (1980). 
This mode of analysis cannot be dispositive of the due process issue involved in 
drug testing. Even assuming that the EMIT test was 96% accurate, and proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt required at least 95% accuracy, this comparison does not 
even address the central due process issue of whether the cost/benefit analysis of 
Mathews l'. Eldridge requires the expenditure of additional funds for confirmation 
testing which would raise the reliability of the reported result to over 99.9%. 
285] DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES 327 
suasive cases support the considerations discussed above, 
which overwhelmingly lead to the conclusion that unconfirmed 
EMIT tests are not sufficiently reliable to satisfy due process 
standards in the context of a criminal contempt proceeding. 
B. Modification of Release Conditions 
The decision to modify conditions of pretrial release is 
similar to the contempt decision, and due process requires 
confirmation of EMIT tests in this circumstance as well. Modi-
fication of release conditions can result in immediate incarcera-
tion of the defendant or other significant restraints on the 
defendant's liberty. Of course, as in the contempt context, due 
process does not require confirmation unless the defendant de-
nies drug usage and contests the reliability of the positive test 
result. 
While modification of conditions of release is similar to 
contempt (and often is considered by the court as an alterna-
tive sanction in contempt proceedings), there are also certain 
differences between the two. One difference is that modification 
of conditions of release does not result in a separate conviction, 
nor a permanent criminal record for contempt of court. In gen-
eral, this makes modification of conditions a less severe 
sanction than contempt, but it is certainly possible that in 
specific cases modification of release conditions will result in a 
longer period of incarceration than a contempt conviction. 153 
Another important difference is that the standard of proof 
for modification of conditions of release ("clear and convincing 
evidence")154 is a lower standard than that for contempt. 
While still a high standard for the government to satisfy, it 
does impose a lesser burden. 
A final difference is that Superior Court judges consider 
modification of release conditions more frequently than con-
tempt proceedings. 155 Thus, there will be a somewhat greater 
number of contested cases where confirmation will be neces-
153. The maximum sentence that can be imposed for contempt is imprisonment 
for six months, see supra text at note 33, but pretrial incarceration lasts an 
indeterminate period of time until the disposition of the case. D.C. Superior Court 
judges generally give priority to cases involving incarcerated defendants, and the 
great majority of these cases are resolved within six months. However, individuals 
subject to pretrial incarceration infrequently must wait more than six months for 
the resolution of their case due to the overcrowding of the court's criminal docket. 
154. See supra note 31. 
155. See supra note 102. 
328 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 5 
sary, increasing the fiscal burden on the government. 
Of course, most of the considerations requiring confirma-
tion in contempt proceedings also apply to modifying conditions 
of release. The defendant faces similar threats to his or her 
liberty (including perhaps an even longer period of incarcera-
tion), and stigmatization. The balancing of interests involved is 
essentially the same. While the due process argument for con-
firmation is less compelling than for contempt proceedings, the 
balance still favors confirmation for contested hearings to modi-
fy release conditions. 
C. The Initial Bail Decision 
Due process does not require confirmation of positive EMIT 
tests prior to the use of these test results by the judicial officer 
in making the initial bail decision. The principal reason for this 
is the need for a very quick decision, and the apparent impossi-
bility of confirming EMIT tests within the allotted period of 
time. 
In D.C. Superior Court, the initial bail hearing is generally 
held within 24 hours of arrest. The defendant obviously has a 
strong interest in a prompt bail decision by the court, and 
would be prejudiced by any unnecessary delay. Indeed, it 
would appear unlawful for the District to routinely delay bail 
hearings for more than 48 hours after arrest in order to con-
duct initial or confirmatory urine tests. 156 
While the District's in-house EMIT testing equipment 
allows arrestee test results to be reported to the judicial officer 
within a very short period (one to two hours), confirmation 
tests like GC/MS must be conducted at certified laboratories 
away from the courthouse. It appears to be impossible to rou-
tinely ship urine samples to an outside laboratory and have the 
tests conducted and reported back to the court within 48 hours 
of arrest. Thus, the constitutional requirement of an expedi-
tious bail decision would seem to negate the possibility of con-
firmation prior to the bail decision. 157 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28. 
157. The Supreme Court has long recognized that in cases involving only "prop-
erty" interests, the need for quick governmental action can justify the temporary 
postponement of a hearing until after those property interests have been adversely 
affected. However, this principle has never been applied to liberty interests be-
cause, unlike temporary deprivations of property, deprivations of liberty interests 
are irreparable. 
For example, in Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230 (1988), a 
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Other factors also diminish the need to confirm EMIT tests 
used in the initial bail determination. The positive drug test 
result is only one piece of information that is used in the bail 
decision, and it is unlikely that it will be the most crucial. 
Other information, such as the defendant's ties to the commu-
nity and record of appearances in prior court cases, are likely 
to have greater weight. However, the drug test result can be an 
important factor in the bail determination, and can even be the 
factor that tips the balance in favor of incarceration or release 
in a particular case. 
Another relevant consideration is the expense involved. 
Since more than half of adult arrestees test positive for drugs, 
confirmation of all positive results would require many thou-
sands of confirmation tests each year. Obviously these tests 
would create a substantial expense. 
The standard for consideration of information at the initial 
bail hearing is important. Generally, the information provided 
to the judicial officer at the initial hearing (by the Pretrial 
Service Agency and defense counsel) is anecdotal and less reli-
able than evidence that may be introduced in future court hear-
ings, such as in contempt proceedings or at trial. However, a 
higher standard of reliability should apply to information such 
as prior convictions or positive drug test results, because they 
are subject to empirical verification, and are more likely to be 
considered reliable for that very reason. 
For all these reasons, particularly the need for a very quick 
decision, due process does not require confirmation of EMIT 
tests prior to the initial bail hearing. 
However, all initial positive test results should be con-
firmed when the defendant is detained or subjected to any 
bank president who had been indicted for banking law violations was temporarily 
suspended from participating in the affairs of his bank by order of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This order was based upon a statutory 
provision which authorized the FDIC to postpone the hearing on the suspension for 
ninety days. Although there was no dispute in the Supreme Court that the bank 
president's property interests had been adversely affected, the Court held that the 
suspension without a prior hearing did not violate due process rights, stating, "An 
important government interest, accompanied by a substantial assurance that the 
deprivation is not baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding 
prompt action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after the initial 
deprivation." !d. at 240 (citing North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 
U.S. 306, 314-21 (1908) (contaminated food)); see also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 
64-66 (1979) (suspension of horse trainer); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-15 
(1977) (suspension of driver's license). 
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significant limits on his or her pretrial liberty. The most com-
pelling situation obviously involves those persons who are pre-
ventively detained, not only because of the applicable "clear 
and convincing evidence" standard, 158 but also because these 
persons cannot be released pretrial, and comprise a very small 
fraction of defendants in Superior Court. In addition, all per-
sons who have been detained in jail under restrictive bail con-
ditions, or released with substantial restrictions on their liber-
ty, should be entitled to. confirmation as a matter of due pro-
cess. No individual should be forced to remain in jail pretrial, 
or be burdened with other substantial restrictions on pretrial 
liberty, if the judicial decision was based in part on erroneous 
information that could be easily corrected. It is important that 
positive drug test results for such persons be confirmed imme-
diately after the initial hearing, and that the court be informed 
expeditiously of all false positive results so that the bail status 
of these individuals can be reconsidered by a judicial officer 
based upon accurate information. 
D. The Sentencing Hearing 
Although the sentencing hearing is obviously not a "pretri-
al" proceeding, it is also useful to consider the need to confirm 
positive EMIT tests in this context. 
Superior Court judges often postpone sentencing for six to 
seven weeks after conviction so that a presentence report can 
be prepared. 159 This report typically includes the results of 
any drug tests taken by the defendant and a section on the 
defendant's use of drugs based upon an interview with the de-
fendant. Most often, the defendant's self-reported drug use 
correlates with the results of the drug testing, but when the 
defendant contests the positive drug test results, confirmation 
of those results should be required by due process if the court 
imposes any substantial restrictions on the defendant's liberty. 
At the sentencing hearing, like the bail hearing, the drug 
test results are only one factor among many that will be consid-
158. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b)(2) (1989). Sef' generally United States v. Ed-
wards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en bane) (holding that the "clear and convincing 
evidence standard" is appropriate in pretrial detention proceedings), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 1022 (1982). 
159. See generally Williams v. United States, 293 A.2d 484, 487 (D.C. 1972) 
("the judge's refusal to obtain a presentencing report" viewed as "highly question-
able"); Wilson v. United States, 278 A.2d 461 (D.C. 1971) ("[T]rial judges are not 
required in every case to obtain a presentencing report."). 
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ered by the court. In addition, the court can consider informa-
tion from a variety of sources, even if that information has not 
been totally verified. 160 One important difference between the 
two proceedings is that when sentencing proceedings are con-
tinued for preparation of a presentence report, there is no need 
for a very quick decision, and there is sufficient time for confir-
mation of any positive drug test result. In light of these consid-
erations, and particularly the fact that very few defendants 
contest the positive drug test results contained in the presen-
tence report, it would appear that due process requires confir-
mation of contested drug test results which will be used at sen-
tencing. 
E. Confirmation of Negative Test Results 
In every context considered so far, only positive drug test 
results had the potential of adversely affecting an individual's 
liberty interests, and therefore only positive results would have 
to be confirmed consistent with due process. However, there is 
one circumstance where due process may require the confirma-
tion of negative drug test results, because they could adversely 
affect an individual's liberty interests - the sentencing of juve-
nile offenders in drug cases. The 1989 survey of superior court 
judges, 161 revealed that several judges were likely to impose 
harsher sentences on juveniles involved in drug offenses who 
tested negative than on juveniles involved in drug offenses who 
tested positive because, as one judge indicated, "[t]hose kids are 
160. The Supreme Court has stated that the sentencing judge "may appropriate-
ly conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of 
information he may consider, or the source from which it may come." United 
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972). However, due process imposes certain 
limitations on the permissible information which can be considered at sentencing. A 
sentence is invalid if it is based upon allegations which are "materially untrue," 
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948), or information which is "inaccurate" 
or "improper." Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 n.7 (1974). See 
generally McPhaul v. United States, 452 A.2d 371 (D.C. 1982) ("While the court 
could properly consider evidence bearing on the severity of the assault in imposing 
sentence, the implication that appellant was being sentenced for homicide [ evi-
denced by the statement " ... as a result of that assault ... a man died within a 
year"] was inappropriate .... "); see also D.C. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 32(B)(3)(A), 
which requires the sentencing court to "afford the defendant or his counsel an 
opportunity to comment" on the information contained in the presentence report, 
and permits the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to permit the defendant "to 
introduce testimony or other information relating to any alleged factual inaccuracy 
contained in the presentence report." 
161. TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15. 
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just doing it for the money." 162 
The use of false negative tests in this narrow context pres-
ents serious due process concerns, particularly because EMIT 
and other screening tests may generate a much greater number 
of false negative results than false positive results. 163 Thus, a 
juvenile facing sentencing in a drug case who contests any 
negative drug test result should have the due process right to 
162. The report noted the following: 
Judges also pointed out that a significant number of juveniles who are 
charged with drug dealing consistently test negative for drugs. This was 
contrasted with the situation for adult defendants, where persons charged 
with drug offenses are usually drug users as well. Several judges com-
mented that they were likely to be harsher on drug-negative than drug-
positive juveniles who are found involved on drug dealing charges because 
as one judge said, "[t]hose kids are just doing it for the money." (empha-
sis in original.) 
TOBORG & BELLASSAI, supra note 15, at 13. 
163. The Visher and McFadden study documented false positive rates for EMIT 
of 2.2% for opiates, 2.5% for eucaine, and 2.1% for marijuana, VISHER & 
McFADDEN, supra note 51, at 3; see also table accompanying note 60. On the 
other hand, the study documented false negative rates for EMIT of 18% for opi-
ates, 23% for cocaine, and 29% for marijuana. VISHER & McFADDEN, supra note 
51, at 4. The following table displays those findings: 
False Negative Rates* by Drug Type 
Percent positives missed by test 
Opiates Cocaine Marijuana PCP Amphetamines 
- RIA m EMIT CJ TDx IS.'SI TLC 
*Positive by GC/MS but negative by screening test 
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have the negative result confirmed. 
F. Conclusions as to the Need to Confirm Drug Test Results 
This article has considered a variety of contexts in which 
drug test results can adversely affect an individual involved in 
a criminal proceeding in D.C. Superior Court. In light of the 
factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge and the other factors 
discussed above, it is possible to prioritize the circumstances 
where due process requires confirmation of contested drug test 
results. Obviously, the most compelling argument is for confir-
mation of drug test results which will be used in criminal con-
tempt proceedings, followed by drug test results which will be 
used in proceedings to preventively detain an individual or 
modify conditions of release so as to incarcerate the defendant. 
Other contexts, such as the sentencing hearing, involve less 
compelling due process arguments for confirmation, but, on 
balance, several of these contexts appear also to require confir-
mation. 
Is it possible to enunciate general principles specifying 
those situations where confirmation is required? In the view of 
this author, due process requires confirmation of initial screen-
ing tests (such as EMIT) before any sanction can be imposed or 
any substantial adverse action can be taken against a defen-
dant based upon the screening test when the defendant dis-
putes the test result. In those rare situations where the need 
for immediate action makes prior confirmation impossible (as 
in the initial bail decision), confirmation should be accom-
plished as quickly as possible after the court's decision when-
ever the court imposes a substantial restraint on the 
defendant's liberty. 164 
These general principles for confirmation of drug test re-
sults are not only required by due process analysis, but are also 
consistent with the great majority of drug testing done today in 
164. Among the variety of sanctions which have been imposed in Superior Court 
for positive drug tests that constitute substantial restraints on liberty are the fol-
lowing: imposing a monetary bond which results in the incarceration of the defen-
dant for any period of time; a curfew or order to "stay away" from an area or 
from a person; a requirement to come to the courthouse every week to provide a 
urine sample; and, a court-ordered referral for drug treatment or counselling which 
requires regular attendance on an in-patient or out-patient basis. Court actions in 
response to positive drug tests which do not appear to impose significant restraints 
on liberty include: a stern lecture by the judge from the bench, and an order to 
maintain telephonic contact with a custodian on a weekly basis. 
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contexts other than the pretrial context. There appears to be a 
consensus of legal, scholarly, and law enforcement authorities 
that confirmation is appropriate and necessary when a sanction 
can be imposed on an individual as a result of drug testing. 
VI. ADDITIONAL DUE PROCESS ISSUES RAISED BY THE 
DISTRICT'S PROGRAM 
In addition to the confirmation issue discussed above, pre-
trial drug testing raises two other substantial due process con-
cerns. The first area of concern is that persons who are arrest-
ed may be given misleading information about the uses of their 
drug test results in court proceedings. The Pretrial Services 
Agency Training and Procedure Manual instructs its staff to 
approach arrestees in the court's lock-up and request a urine 
sample, informing the arrestee that the results of the test per-
formed on the sample "will be used only to determine condi-
tions of release in your case. They cannot be used to find you 
guilty or innocent of today's charges."165 The PSA representa-
tive cannot compel the arrestee to submit an initial urine sam-
ple but can only obtain the sample with the arrestee's consent 
and cooperation. The information provided to the arrestee on 
the possible uses of the urine test result in the court proceeding 
thus constitutes critical information for the arrestee to consider 
in deciding whether or not to provide a urine sample. 
The PSA Training Manual directive is seriously misleading 
in that a positive test result can be introduced at trial to im-
peach the defendant who testifies. 166 Even though the drug 
test result cannot be introduced in the government's case-in-
chief, the use for impeachment purposes is potentially quite 
damaging to a defendant who takes the witness stand at trial 
and testifies that he or she did not use drugs. Such impeach-
ment could totally destroy the credibility of the defendant. 
The Supreme Court has long held that procedural due 
process requires notice that is "reasonably calculated to ap-
praise" a person of the consequences of governmental ac-
tion. 167 The Court has also made clear that where the individ-
ual interests at stake are substantial, there must be even 
165. See supra note 43. 
166. See Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1988), discussed supra at 
note 43; see also Patterson v. United States, 580 A.2d 1319 (D.C. 1990). 
167. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798 (1983); Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
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greater certainty that the notice will be effective. 168 
PSA's current notice to arrestees clearly violates these 
principles, and must be modified. An accurate and constitution-
ally acceptable notice would inform the arrestee that the drug 
test result "will be used by the judicial officer in making a 
release decision, and can possibly be used against you if you 
testify at the trial in this case."169 
The second due process issue raised by the District's drug 
testing program is whether urine samples must be preserved 
by PSA so that they can be provided to defendants upon re-
quest for re-testing at an independent laboratory. In general, 
due process requires the government to preserve and make 
available to defendants in criminal cases all evidence that may 
be exculpatory and that "might be expected to play a significant 
role in the suspect's defense."170 
While there is some authority for applying this principle to 
the drug testing area, 171 the Supreme Court's decision in 
California v. Trombetta, 172 holding that the government need 
not preserve breath samples of suspected drunk drivers, would 
seem to substantially undercut any similar argument for urine 
samples used in drug testing. The Court's decision in 
Trombetta was based upon three principal rationales. First, 
given the reliability of the state's breath-analysis procedures, 
the chances were "extremely low that preserved samples would 
168. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1982); Memphis Light, Gas & 
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978). See generally TRIBE, supra note 78, 
at 732-36. 
169. In addition to due process concerns, the District's testing program also 
raises concerns with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. However, this privilege extends only to testimonial evidence, not physical 
evidence obtained from bodily fluids such as blood and urine. See Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1966) (blood test); Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. 
Power Dist., 653 F. Supp. 1510, 1527-28 (D. Neb. 1987) (urine test), affd, 884 F.2d 
562, 567 (8th Cir. 1988). Even assuming that this barrier could be overcome, there 
is a substantial question as to whether the use of drug test results for impeach-
ment purposes would constitute a "substantial hazard" of self-incrimination, which 
is also required to invoke this Fifth Amendment privilege. See California v. Byers, 
402 U.S. 424, 429 (1971). 
170. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976). 
171. State v. Quelnan, 767 P.2d 243 (Haw. 1989) (unclear if decision based on 
constitutional or statutory grounds); People v. Moore, 666 P.2d 419 (Cal. 1983) 
(probation revocation proceeding prior to California v. Trombetta); Banks v. FAA, 
687 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1982) (employment termination also prior to California v. 
Trombetta). See generally Lois Yurow, Comment, Alternative Challenges to Drug 
Testing, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 148, 165-68 (1989). 
172. 467 U.S. 479 (1984). 
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have been exculpatory" and were "much more likely" to provide 
inculpatory evidence if retested by the defendant. 173 This ra-
tionale would certainly apply to the District's drug testing pro-
gram if the District confirmed the EMIT test with a more reli-
able confirmation test such as GC/MS. Even in the absence of 
such confirmation, it would be difficult to convince a court that 
a re-test of EMIT by the defendant would be more likely to 
provide exculpatory than inculpatory evidence. 174 
Even if this first rationale could be overcome, the second 
rationale of the Court's decision was that the defendant had 
other reasonably available means of challenging the accuracy of 
the breath-analysis testing procedures. 175 This same rationale 
would also apply to drug testing because the reliability of the 
procedures employed is subject to similar challenges by the 
defendant. 176 
The final rationale of the Court's decision was that the 
police had not acted in bad faith in destroying the breath sam-
ples but in accord with their normal practice. 177 Similarly, no 
bad faith could reasonably be claimed because PSA routinely 
discards urine samples after its testing has been completed. 
Thus, for all these reasons, it appears virtually certain that the 
courts would not recognize a due process requirement to retain 
urine samples for re-testing by the defendant. 
VII. THE MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE TEST 
The final topic discussed in this article is the usefulness of 
the Mathews v. Eldridge equation in determining the scope of 
due process protections, particularly whether due process re-
quires confirmation of EMIT screening tests. The Mathews v. 
Eldridge test, as noted above, has been the subject of consid-
173. Id. at 489-90. 
174. Several cases involving prison disciplinary proceedings have also ruled that 
an inmate has no due process right to re-test a challenged urine sample. Spence v. 
Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 755-56 (8th Cir. 1986); Hoeppner v. State, 379 N.W.2d 23, 
25-26 (Iowa App. 1985) (re-test would not disprove "some evidence" of drug use); 
Pella v. Adams, 723 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Nev. 1989). 
175. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-90. These alternatives included cross-examina-
tion of the operator of the breath-analysis equipment, and introduction of documen-
tary evidence concerning the reliability of the equipment. Id. 
176. See supra notes 59 & 151. 
177. 467 U.S. at 488; see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), where 
the Court held that in the absence of bad faith on the part of the police, the 
failure to preserve semen samples or other "potentially useful evidence" does not 
constitute a denial of due process. Id. at !'i8. 
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erable scholarly criticism, including criticism that it focuses 
exclusively on "instrumental" judgments about the accuracy of 
a proceeding. 178 
The area of pretrial drug testing offers a useful vantage 
point to evaluate these criticisms. Insuring the reliability of 
drug testing results would seem to involve essentially "instru-
mental" judgments, which the Mathews v. Eldridge equation 
was designed to resolve. How useful is the Mathews v. Eldridge 
test? 
The Mathews v. Eldridge test clearly focuses on three fac-
tors which are important in considering whether or not due 
process requires confirmation of initial screening tests. The 
interests of the individual and the government in such confir-
mation testing are obviously highly relevant considerations, as 
are the cost/benefit considerations. If a confirmation test of-
fered minimally increased reliability at great expense, it would 
undercut any due process right to such confirmation. Converse-
ly, if a confirmation test offered substantially increased reliabil-
ity (here virtual certainty with GC/MS confirmation) at mini-
mal expense, it would substantially strengthen the due process 
right to such confirmation. It is thus apparent that each of the 
three Mathews v. Eldridge factors reflect important consider-
ations in the due process calculus. 
However, the Mathews v. Eldridge equation does not en-
compass other factors that are perhaps even more important in 
determining whether confirmation procedures are required by 
due process. The applicable burden of proof is one such factor. 
In other words, what degree of reliability must the drug test 
have in the proceeding? This is an important consideration in 
all drug testing contexts, and it may be the most important 
consideration in certain contexts, i.e., when the standard of 
proof is extremely low ("any evidence" of drug use for prison 
disciplinary proceedings) or very high (proof "beyond a reason-
able doubt" in contempt proceedings). 
Another important consideration is how quickly the drug 
test results must be provided to the decisionmaker. This would 
appear to be the central consideration in the determination 
that confirmation is not required prior to use of drug test re-
sults in the initial bail hearing. 
In addition, how central is the drug test result to the spe-
178. See supra notes 77 -IH. 
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cific decision involved? There is obviously an important distinc-
tion between the need to verify a drug test which will be the 
sole evidence in a proceeding for contempt or to modify condi-
tions of release, and the need to verify a drug test which will be 
one of many factors in proceedings such as sentencing hearings 
and initial bail hearings. Closely related is the nature of the 
proceeding, i.e., whether it is a retrospective decision which 
seeks to punish for past transgressions (as in a contempt pro-
ceeding), or a prospective decision which seeks to predict future 
conduct (as in the initial bail decision). 
A final important consideration is what other jurisdictions 
require with respect to drug testing, and what the weight of 
scientific and legal opinion is with respect to confirmation test-
ing. To the extent that confirmation is required in other con-
texts and is not prohibitively expensive, such confirmation may 
also be determined to be necessary for pretrial testing. 
These additional factors, which were not set forth in 
Mathews v. Eldridge/79 are important considerations in the 
due process equation. In certain pretrial contexts, such as the 
contempt hearing and the initial bail hearing, these additional 
factors appear to be of greater importance in resolving the due 
process issue than the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. 
This is not to advocate abandonment of the three factors 
set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge. These factors must, however, 
be supplemented with the additional factors set forth above if 
there is to be a thorough consideration of the interests involved 
in confirming drug testing results in the pretrial context. 
Whether the issue involves the EMIT test or newer technolo-
gies that are becoming available, 180 the courts must employ a 
comprehensive framework for analyzing the extent of due pro-
cess protections required for pretrial drug testing programs. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Pretrial drug testing programs may expand substantially 
in state and federal courts in the next few years, based upon 
the District of Columbia model. There are, however, major 
flaws in the District's program, especially the failure to confirm 
positive EMIT screening tests with more reliable confirmatory 
179. Several of these factors were considered by the Supreme Court in other 
cases involving due process protections, as discussed supra text accompanying notes 
122-23. 
180. CLARK, supra note 106, at 34 n.12. 
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tests, and providing persons who are arrested with misleading 
information on the use of drug test results in their court cases. 
In these important respects, the District's program violates 
fundamental due process principles. The District should modify 
its procedures to comply with procedural due process guaran-
tees, and persons implementing newer drug testing programs 
should be careful to insure that their procedures satisfy due 
process requirements as well. Since important liberty interests 
are at stake, it is crucial that drug testing programs be based 
on fair and reliable procedures. 
